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Abstract           
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether abnormal returns are earned on insider 
trading on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). The study first tests the strong form of 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis by investigating whether abnormal returns are earned by 
directors purchasing or selling their own firms’ shares, and thereafter the semi-strong 
form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis by investigating the occurrence of abnormal 
returns earned by outsiders mimicking these director transactions once they are publically 
announced (which has to be within 48 hours). In addition, this study tests whether these 
abnormal returns are dependent on firm size, and secondly whether a firm’s industry 
classification, as defined by the JSE, has an effect on the magnitude of abnormal returns 
earned by directors and outsiders mimicking these transactions.  Event study 
methodology, in conjunction with the Market Model, is used to calculate the abnormal 
returns for a sample of 1,026 directors’ trades made on the JSE between 2007 and 2012. 
The results indicate that directors in many of the subsamples tested earn statistically 
significant abnormal returns in the short term (defined as 20 days post the event date), 
when purchasing or selling shares in their own companies, although more so on sale 
trades. There is strong evidence of directors being able to time the market, and that 
outsiders can mimic directors’ trades once these become public knowledge to also earn 
abnormal profits. These findings are inconsistent with both the strong and semi-strong 
forms of market efficiency.  The study further finds a negative correlation between 
abnormal returns earned and firm size for both director share purchases and sales. This 
supports the theory that insiders in smaller companies, which are less exposed to market 
scrutiny than larger firms, possess greater private information than their counterparts in 
larger listed businesses. Finally, it is found that the highest insider abnormal returns were 
earned by director purchases in the Basic Materials and Oil & Gas sector, with the lowest 
abnormal returns earned in the Consumer Goods and Technology and 
Telecommunications sectors. The findings of this study have both theoretical implications 
in terms of the market efficiency of the JSE, as well as practical insights for investors 
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1.  Introduction 
Numerous studies around the world have provided evidence both for and against 
abnormal returns being earned by directors trading in their own firms’ shares. 
Researchers who found that abnormal earnings can be earned by insider trades explain 
this in terms of directors trading on superior information compared to that of the market 
(Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Rennenboog, 2004). Director purchases in particular are seen as 
credible sources of information for outside investors, as the directors are investing their 
own wealth into the future prospects of their firm. Furthermore, as their income and 
investment gains are drawn from the same source, these directors often have less than 
optimal diversification to their own portfolios, which enhances the signal their trades send 
to the market regarding their companies. 
Insider trading, as defined, incorporates both legal and illegal conduct (Commission, U.S. 
Securities Exchange, 2013). Insider actions that constitute illegal conduct is similar in most 
countries, and the trading of shares in one’s own firm while in possession of material non-
public information (and in so doing breaching a director’s fiduciary duty), is prohibited. In 
most countries directors are permitted to use information gained from their position to 
trade in their own firm’s shares, provided the information is not price sensitive and the 
required public disclosure process is followed. In addition, directors are not prohibited 
from taking a public view on whether the share price is under or overvalued by the market. 
Insider trading is regulated in most countries due to its perceived harmfulness to the 
market and its participants (Etebari, Tourani-Reid, and Gilbert, 2003). This is also the case 
in South Africa, where the country continues to strive to lessen the divide between the 
‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2015). The effects of insider 
trading includes increased bid-ask spreads (Chung and Charoenwong, 1998), reduced 
investor confidence (Leland, 1992), and reduced market liquidity (Leland, 1992, and 
Friederich, 2002). Insider trading has therefore become increasingly regulated in many 
countries, including South Africa. 
If director insider trades convey valuable inside information, a question that arises is 
whether outsiders can earn abnormal returns by simply mimicking the insider trades.   This 
study, using companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) main board as a 
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sample, therefore investigates, under various stylised facts, whether (i) it is possible for 
insiders investing in their own companies’ share on the JSE to earn abnormal returns, and 
(ii) whether outsiders can do the same by using these trades as trading signals.  The 
stylised facts include the company’s market capitalisation (size) and industry classification 
(sector), and the impact of these company attributes on the abnormal returns generated 
by these trades, if any. As far as the author is aware, only a very small number of studies 
globally1 have investigated the size and industry relationship to insider returns, and no 
prior study has addressed this issue in the South African context. This study therefore fills 
this gap in the literature. From a practical perspective, the results of this  study  may 
indicate to  outside investors which class(es) of director trades (if any) are potentially most 
profitable to mimic in order to earn abnormal returns, although admittedly there is a brief 
lag between the director’s trade and the announcement of the trade to the public. 
In terms of process, this study will firstly build a base by investigating the abnormal profits 
that can be earned by outsiders by mimicking directors’ trades2, both for their buy and 
sell trades, by using data for the period 2007 to 2012. The study will look at the abnormal 
returns over the period -20 to +20 days relative to the public announcement of the 
director trade3, to identify if any abnormal returns earned in following directors are  
earned immediately post the director’s trade, or are possibly sustained over a more 
medium term.  
Thereafter the study will analyse if a firm’s size affects the abnormal returns available to 
investors mimicking director trades. This will be based on the theory that a director’s 
insider advantage is inversely correlated to firm size as (i) information on larger companies 
is generally more widely available, and therefore the signalling value on these directors’ 
trades may be less if the information they trade on is already public knowledge, (ii) 
similarly, larger companies enjoy greater attention from analysts and investors than 
                                                          
1 Ek and Erlinder (2015) investigated how the size and industry of firms on the Swedish stock exchange effect the 
abnormal returns available to insiders, whilst Hong and Huang (2005) investigated the effect a firm’s size has on the 
abnormal returns available to insiders. 
2 For this study, the terms insider and director will be used interchangeably, and outside investors will refer to all   
market participants external to the particular firm at hand. 
3 The study will use the date on which the transaction is announced on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange’s SENS 
platform as the event date. Throughout the study the use of the terms event date and SENS announcement date will 




smaller companies, and the information asymmetry between directors (insiders) and 
outsiders is thus likely to be less in these cases, and (iii) there is a greater separation 
between ownership and management in larger firms (Gregory, Matatko, Tonks, & Purkis,  
1994). Prior South African studies (see, for example, van der Plas, 2007, and Nair, 2008) 
specifically excluded small capitalisation (henceforward referred to as small cap) firms due 
to the liquidity problems associated with the shares of these firms in the South African 
environment, which would impact the validity of study findings. Small cap firms however, 
were included in the present study, after making adjustments for liquidity factors in the 
calculations. As can be seen from Table 1 below, the South African small-cap equity 
market represents 3% of the total market cap of stocks listed on the JSE as at 31 December 
2015. Although this is not a significant percentage, there exists the possibility for directors 
as well as outsiders mimicking these transactions to earn abnormal returns.  It would thus 
be beneficial to investigate the ability for the directors of these firms to earn abnormal 
returns, an aspect missing from the current (limited) academic research of insider trades 
in South Africa. 
Table 1 - JSE by Market Capitalisation (at 31 December 2015) 
 
 The results will be used to identify which class of firm by size would provide the greatest 
abnormal returns to directors trading in their own firms, as well as the best opportunity 




Rm's Top 40 % Mid Cap % Small Cap % Fledgling % Total
2007 4 303 130    85% 596 589    12% 133 277        3% 49 556         1% 5 082 551      
2008 2 533 936    83% 421 487    14% 87 932          3% 25 146         1% 3 068 502      
2009 3 732 772    85% 559 867    13% 97 433          2% 23 958         1% 4 414 031      
2010 4 159 567    83% 682 293    14% 126 144        3% 24 649         0% 4 992 652      
2011 4 568 080    83% 773 362    14% 132 550        2% 29 101         1% 5 503 094      
2012 6 208 431    84% 969 075    13% 186 497        3% 49 159         1% 7 413 162      
2013 7 320 739    84% 1 117 482 13% 233 817        3% 55 148         1% 8 727 186      
2014 8 400 251    83% 1 329 683 13% 296 812        3% 71 597         1% 10 098 342   
2015 9 278 797    85% 1 320 886 12% 290 481        3% 75 480         1% 10 965 644   
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Thereafter each broad size classification will be analysed independently, and its insider 
trade abnormal returns calculated in relation to the relevant benchmark for that size 
company4 as opposed to the market as a whole (as was the case in the first part of the 
size analysis).  
In addition, the study will review whether a company’s sector, as defined by its industry 
classification according to the JSE, affects the abnormal returns earned from the director 
dealings and which, if any, of the industries provide the best opportunities for outside 
investors to mimic directors’ trades in order to earn abnormal profits. The JSE’s sector 
classification is based on that of the ICB (the International Classification Benchmark). 
There are three broad categories: Resources, Financials and Industrials. The second level 
of this classification, along with the number of firms in each as at 31 August 2016, is listed 
below:  
Table 2 - JSE by Industry Classification as at 31 August 2016 
 
The rest of the introduction will deal with a comparison of insider trading legislation of 
two of the most established regulation systems (that of the US and the UK), as well as the 
more recently established South African regulation system, before discussing the 
hypotheses and definitions that form the basis of this study. 
 
 
                                                          
4 An example to further illustrate the procedure would be as follows: an investor trading in a small cap firm would have 
the returns earned from that trade compared to the chosen small cap benchmark for the same period to calculate the 
abnormal return; likewise a trade in a large cap firm would be compared to that of the chosen large cap benchmark. 
Therefore a like for like comparison will be made to formulate the findings. 
 
Industry Number of Firms










1.1. Comparison of Legislation 
Most countries have some form of insider regulation in place to protect the market and 
investors from the harm insider trading can cause. The principal argument for the 
regulation of insider trading centres around the fairness5 to market participants and 
market sustainability if insiders had the unfair advantage of being able to trade on 
material insider knowledge prior to the information being released to the market (Nair, 
2008). Other arguments for the regulation of insider trading include that insider trading 
incentivises managers to take corporate actions that are not in the best interest of the 
firm so as to trade on this information for their own personal profit (Leland, 1992), whilst 
Padilla (2011) states that insider trading should be regulated because investors shun 
markets where insider trading is prevalent, thus hampering capital market development. 
Arguments against insider trading (and hence for the legalisation of insider trading) 
include the following: (i) it promotes market efficiency (Hammil, Mcinkenny, and Opong, 
2002) through the increase flow of information to the market, which in turn helps the 
market formulate a price for the firm (Manne, 1966), (ii) it allows outsiders access to the 
previously restricted insider information post the director’s trade, which will see market 
prices moving toward their fundamental share value (Nair, 2008, and Manne, 1966), and 
(iii) by allowing insider trading, directors are incentivised to seek and produce additional 
information that will then be passed onto the market once the insider earns an abnormal 
return (Manne, 1966). 
Those arguing against insider regulation believe that the share price information acquired 
to maintain accurate security prices (economic efficiency factors) outweigh the cost of 
insider profits (fairness for all shareholders) (Hammil, Mcinkenny, and Opong, 2002). As 
put forward by the Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman (2003, cited in Hotson, Kaur, and 
Singh, 2007) "You want more insider trading, not less. You want to give the people most 
                                                          
5 Fairness, in financial markets, has been described as all parties having equal access to information relevant 
to asset valuation (Shefrin & Statman, 1993). It can therefore be contended that allowing insider trading 
would mean that certain market participants, specifically those not privy to insider information, are 
significantly disadvantaged as they receive the relevant information late or not at all. Should these 
participants withdraw from the market, the argument goes that the sustainability of the financial markets 




likely to have knowledge about deficiencies of the company an incentive to make the public 
aware of that”. 
South Africa adopted insider trading regulation fairly late (Chitimira, 2014) compared to 
the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU). Despite both being 
leaders in insider trading regulations, the systems of the US and UK/EU differ somewhat, 
with the US using a “Fiduciary-Duty”6 based theory and the UK/EU using a “Parity of 
Information” 7 based  theory, as a basis for their insider trade regulation. South Africa, in 
turn, has largely based its insider trading regulation on the UK system.  
1.1.1. US Legislation 
Insider trading regulation in the US can be dated as far back as 1909, when the US 
Supreme Court found that a director who knew his company’s share price was to increase 
was committing fraud by acting on this information. Subsequently, the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) started regulating insider trading in 1933. The “Parity of 
Information” theory formed the basis of regulation from 1933 until 1980, when the US 
Supreme Court altered the basis of the US regulation by ruling that an insider was only in 
violation of insider trading if they i) acted on material non-public information, and ii) acted 
contrary to their fiduciary duty. In so doing the SEC did not explicitly prohibit insider 
trading; rather a director’s trade in his or her own company’s stock is deemed legal if the 
director releases the information to the market in accordance with the guidelines 
imposed by the SEC (Hu and Noe, 1997).  
The rules governing the disclosure of the trade depend on whether the director holds 
stock in the firm already. If they do then they are required to report their change in 
ownership electronically to the SEC within 2 business days, and if they do not within 10 
business days. The director’s company is required to post the trade on its own website, if 
they have one, by the end of the next business day following the filing of the trade with 
                                                          
6 Fiduciary Duty is a legal obligation of someone entrusted with the care of the business to act in the best 
interests of another party. 
7 The Parity of Information theory has anyone who obtains, or is aware of, material non-public information 
in regards to an issuer or security because of their professional activity should either disclose the 
information (when allowed to) or abstain from trading on the information (Ventoruzzo, 2014). 
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the SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013). The information received by 
the SEC is then included in the SEC’s online EDGAR system.  
Under US legislation insiders include both executive and non-executive directors, as well 
as other key employees, and also shareholders holding 10% or more of any equity class 
(Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). 
The most controversial issue with the US legislation, when compared to other leading 
insider legislation, is the need to identify what constitutes a fiduciary duty using case law, 
which complicates matters. The fiduciary duty can be summarised as the relationship of 
trust and confidence between the director of the company and other parties. More 
specifically the director is required to refrain from self-dealing in confidential information 
owned by another party - in this case information created by the company itself 
(Bainbridge, 2001). Rather the director has a fiduciary duty to protect other shareholders, 
and therefore trading in a way to benefit him/herself to the detriment of other 
shareholders by using insider information they may possess, would be in breach of this 
duty. 
1.1.2. UK Legislation 
UK insider trading regulation has not been in place as long as its US counterpart, with 
insider trading only labelled as illegal as late as 1980 with the enactment of sections 69-
73 Part V of the Companies Act 1980 (Franklin, 2013).  Thereafter the provisions were 
consolidated into the Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, before being 
amended by the Financial Services Act 1986, which together with the 1977 Model Code 
of the LSE (London Stock Exchange), governed insider trading in the UK for some time 
(Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneborg, 2006).  
The European Community, EC, which the UK is currently still part of, later agreed to 
coordinate rules around insider trading which led the UK to enact Part V of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1993. This however did not lead to many prosecutions against individuals for 
insider trading due to the high standards required to find the defendant guilty of a criminal 
offence. In response to this issue the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 was 
introduced which allowed an additional civil charge to be levied against an individual for 
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‘market abuse’. The civil charge requiring less onerous evidence than the criminal charge 
and thus increasing the likelihood of prosecution. 
Insider information is defined as “information that is not generally available and that a 
reasonable investor would use to help them make investment decisions. It is also 
information that, if generally available, would be likely to significantly affect the price of 
an investment” (Financial Services Authority, 2008). 
The UK regulations are more restrictive than their US counterpart, with the main 
restrictions for directors trading in their own companies’ stocks including: (i) prohibited 
dealing within 60 days preceding the preliminary announcements of the final and interim 
results and 30 days preceding quarterly earnings announcements results, ii) a prohibition 
on trading when in possession of price-sensitive unpublished information, iii) a 
requirement to obtain clearance from the company chairman before trading (subject to 
the restriction mentioned in i) above, and iv) a requirement for the disclosure of any 
insider dealings to the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) within four business days of 
the trade. 
Mandatory reporting in the UK is limited to executive board members and non-executive 
directors, excluding other key employees and large shareholders, which is slightly less 
onerous than the US where all directors, other key employees and shareholders holding 
more than 10% of any equity class are required to disclose their trades (Fidrmuc et al., 
2006).  
In summary, one of the key differences between the US and UK systems stem from the 
US attempting to mitigate insider advantages by frequent disclosure; whereas the UK 
system places bans on trades during price-sensitive periods (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). This 
could be interpreted that the US is more liberal regarding insider trading as it is allowed 
at any time; however it must always be reported to allow the market to act on the 
information. 
1.1.3. SA Legislation 
The need for insider trading regulation may be seen as even more necessary in SA due to 
the ongoing struggle to attract and retain investment flows. To encourage flows market 
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participants need to be comfortable in viewing the market itself as being efficient, fair and 
reputable, which in turn requires a transparent system that either prevents insider trading 
(similar to UK regulation) and/or requires constant disclosure of the trades (similar to US 
regulation). 
Until 1999 insider trading was dealt with by the Companies Act of 1973, which in cases of 
insider trading required guilt to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for criminal sanction 
to be meted out. This made a successful prosecution highly unlikely, resulting in no cases 
being taken to court prior to 1998 (Nair, 2008). The Insider Trading Act (1998) 
(Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2015) introduced the possibility of civil action in addition 
to the existing criminal action as a course of action in the context of suspected insider 
trading. Civil action requires a balance of probabilities to be used for a decision to be made 
on any offences, making it more likely than before that insiders would be prosecuted for 
trading on non-public material information. 2013 saw the introduction of the Financial 
Markets Act (2012) which dealt with market abuses of insider trading, amongst other 
issues. (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2015) 
The definition of insiders is broad and includes directors, employees and advisors, as well 
as other individuals who may have received the information inadvertently or in an 
unguarded social setting; similar to the US and UK systems. This definition of an insider 
was used in the analysis to follow (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2015). 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)’s reasoning for requiring the disclosure of insider 
trades is to ensure a greater degree of public access to insider views so that no individual 
has an excessive undue informational advantage when trading. The JSE does not recognise 
information, deemed as material to investors, as being public until it is disseminated 
through its JSE Stock Exchange News Service (SENS), and a company is in fact required to 
wait until SENS have disclosed the information before placing any price sensitive 
information on their own website (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2015). 
The JSE has introduced additional listing requirements for director dealings, many of 
which are based on the rules in place in the UK. These include: i) a director is prohibited 
from trading in securities of their firm without the prior permission of their companies’ 
chairperson, ii) a director may not be given permission to trade during a prohibited 
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period8, iii) a director is required to disclose any trades to their company within 24 hours, 
iv) and the company is required to disclose the trade publically (to the SENS) within 24 
hours of receipt of the information (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2015). 
It is clear that SA has adopted a system much the same as the UK, using a balance of 
probabilities theory,9 along with a greater emphasis on banning insider trades during 
certain periods.  
1.2. Relevant Theories and Hypotheses  
The next section will cover certain key financial theories important in the topic of insider 
trading. 
1.2.1. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)  
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) implies that in an efficient market all available 
information must be reflected in the share market price (Fama, 1965). Share prices would 
thus adjust immediately as the market changes its perception regarding a share.  
Malkiel and Fama (1970), in a later paper, introduced three forms of market efficiency, 
respectively defined as follows: 
i) Weak form: Current stock prices reflect all past information. 
ii) Semi-strong form: Current stock prices reflect past information as well as 
currently available public information. 
iii) Strong form: Current stock prices reflect all public and non-public information. In 
other words, it includes both past and current publically available information, as 
well as non-public information (Malkiel and Fama, 1970). 
The strong form of the EMH implies that directors that have access to insider information 
should not be able to earn abnormal returns. If directors of South African companies were 
                                                          
8 A prohibited period is defined as either, a) the date from the financial year end up to the publication of 
the earliest report, b) mid-year and quarter-year ends and the publishing of those results, and c) any period 
during which the company is under a cautionary announcement. 
9 The balance of probabilities theory means that a court will deem an event as occurring if the court, based 
on the evidence presented, considers the event’s occurrence more likely than not (RE H and Others 
(Minors), 1995). Expressed in percentage terms, the judge only needs to conclude that there is more than 
50% likelihood that the claimant’s case is right, then the claimant will win and the defendant will lose. In 
respect to insider trading, the insider is the defendant. 
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able to time the market in terms of buying their company’s shares before a share price 
increase, and likewise sell before a share price decrease, then it would indicate that the 
South African market is not strong-form efficient. Directors have insider information 
pertaining to their company resulting from their position within the company; however 
what is of interest is whether they trade on this information before it becomes public. If 
it is found that directors do earn abnormal profits then it can be argued that this is the 
result of their access to insider information, which would infer that the South African 
market is strong-form inefficient (Neill, Sadeghi, and Watts, 2008).  
Similarly, if outside investors are able to earn abnormal returns by mimicking insider 
trades, then a market is not semi-strong form efficient. The insider’s trade, which is 
deemed to carry information about the company, becomes public data once it is 
disseminated via public communication platforms such as SENS in South Africa. If outside 
investors are able to earn abnormal returns by trading these shares based on publically 
announced directors’ trades, then the market cannot be semi-strong form efficient, as the 
market’s share price then does not include all current and past information.  
1.2.2. The Signalling Hypothesis 
Signalling Theory has been part of academic discourse since Spence (1973) published a 
seminal paper in which he introduced his job-market signalling model. Signalling is based 
on the idea of asymmetric information, where one party has better access to information, 
and is defined as one party, through an action, indirectly conveying that better 
information to another party.  
Many papers on insider trading (only a small sample of which are discussed here) conclude 
that outsiders can earn abnormal profits by mimicking insider trades (generally before 
transaction costs are accounted for), as insiders are seen as holding superior information 
related to their company. In terms of Signalling Theory discussed above, insiders have 
asymmetric information that, by trading in their company’s shares, they convey to outside 
investors. For example, Bettis, Vickrey and Vickrey (1997) found in their study, where they 
analysed the US market between 1985 and 1990, that outsiders could earn significant 
abnormal returns by mimicking insider trades. The insiders are deemed to have access to 
better information, which outsiders are able to interpret through the director’s’ trades 
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and trade for their own account accordingly. Similarly, a study performed by Zingg, Lang 
and Wyttenbach (2007) on 2,302 insider transactions in 2005 and 2006 on the Swiss stock 
market found that abnormal returns could be earned by outsiders mimicking insider 
trades, likely due to the assymetric information held by these insiders. This study, 
however, found that the outsiders’ abnormal profits are insignificant once transaction 
costs are accounted for. Stotz (2006), based on a sample of 976 insider trades on the 
German stock exchange between July 2002 and July 2003, also found that abnormal 
returns are possible for outsiders mimicking insider trades. Outsiders were able to earn 
2.81% on mimicked purchases and 2.20% on mimicked sales, both before transaction 
costs. Where Stotz’s (2006) findings differed from those of Zingg, Lang and Wyttenbach 
(2007), was the ability for an outsider to continue to earn significant abnormal returns 
post transaction costs.  
1.2.3. Formulation of Hypotheses 
The objectives of this study are to investigate whether directors trading in the shares of 
their companies on the JSE are able to earn abnormal returns (including when considering 
purchases and sales separately), and more specifically whether mimicking such trades 
form a basis for a profitable trading strategy for outside investors. The second objective 
of this study is to test whether firm size and firm industry is related to any abnormal 
returns that may be present. 
The hypotheses to be tested are therefore as follows: 
H10 : Abnormal returns cannot be earned on the JSE by mimicking directors’  insider share 
trades 
H1a : Abnormal returns can be earned on the JSE by mimicking directors’ insider share 
trades 
H20 : Abnormal returns cannot be earned on the JSE by mimicking directors’ insider share 
purchases 




H30 : Abnormal returns cannot be earned on the JSE by mimicking directors’ insider share 
sales 
H3a : Abnormal returns can be earned on the JSE  by mimicking directors’ insider share 
sales 
If the empirical evidence on the JSE supports any of the above alternative hypotheses, the 
applicable following hypotheses will be investigated: 
H40 : Abnormal returns earned by investors mimicking directors’ inside trades on the JSE 
is independent of the size of the companies involved 
H4a : Abnormal returns earned by investors mimicking directors’ inside trades on the JSE 
is dependent on the size of the companies involved 
H50 : Abnormal returns earned by investors mimicking directors’ inside trades on the JSE 
is independent of the industry involved 
H5a : Abnormal returns earned by investors mimicking directors’ inside trades on the JSE 
is dependent on the industry involved 
In addition to the testing of the above hypotheses, the study will indirectly also test if 
directors are able to earn abnormal returns through their insider trades on the JSE. The 
testing of both directors’ trades and the ability for outside investors to mimic these insider 
trades to earn abnormal returns is possible because of the close proximity of the director’s 
trade and the SENS announcement date (the first opportunity for the outside investor to 
mimic the directors’ insider trade). This is the result of a SENS listing requirement that a 
director’s trade must be disclosed within 48 hours of the trade itself. 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 will look at the 
international and local literature regarding director dealings. Chapter 3 will introduce the 
sample and data to be used in this study, while the research methodology will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. The results will be presented, analysed and discussed in Chapter 





2.  Literature Review 
The literature review will firstly discuss international literature on insider trading before 
moving onto the South African literature. The international literature has a long history 
and a large number of papers have focussed on the topic of insider trading and issues 
related to it, and therefore the discussion below is grouped by topic.  The South African 
literature on insider trading is quite sparse by comparison, and will be fully analysed in 
the second part of this chapter. 
2.1. Existing international studies  
Insider trading has been extensively researched by international academics. In this regard, 
the ability of insiders to earn abnormal returns has been investigated in the US as far back 
as the 1970s (Jaffe, 1974), with recent research on the topic particularly prevalent in the 
UK, Australia and the US. 
2.1.1. Timing the market 
Directors are in the unique position that they receive information before outside market 
participants do, despite regulations in place to negate this advantage.  
Past studies found that directors act as contrarian investors; buying stocks after the price 
has fallen and selling when the price has risen (Uylangco, Easton, and Faff, 2010), using 
their first mover advantage to earn abnormal profits. Looking at the buy transaction in 
isolation, the director will attempt to time the buy of the share right after it has 
experienced a decline, purchasing it before the market has had time to change its view 
from a sell to a buy. The contrary is true for the selling perspective of a director’s trade; 
holding the share while its price appreciates and selling it before the price begins to 
depreciate (Stotz, 2006). In so doing directors use their inside knowledge to time the 
market, generally earning higher profits than outside investors, as they get the first mover 
advantage. 
Directors buy shares presumably when they see value as stated in the prior paragraph; 
while outsiders in terms of Signalling Theory assume that directors have superior 
knowledge (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001), and can thus potentially mimic directors’ trades 
in an attempt to earn abnormal profits. One issue that complicates the reasoning for 
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abnormal profits is that director trades themselves may generate a portion, if not all of 
the abnormal returns, simply because outside investors may be mimicking the trade solely 
because it is made by a director. The outside investors accept that insiders may have 
superior information, even if they in fact do not, and in so doing through momentum 
trading cause a greater share price change, therefore creating a larger abnormal return 
for the insider (Givoly and Palmon, 1985). This increased profit effect would generally only 
result in shorter term profits, as it is unrelated to any fundamental information, and 
outsiders will soon realise that there is no informational value to the director’s trade.  
The existence of abnormal returns can be construed as the market reacting to information 
received in advance of a public announcement through legitimate channels. Studies are 
wide ranging but point to the same conclusion - price sensitive information is acted upon 
by directors pre-announcement, and outsiders can mimic these trades to earn their 
portion of abnormal returns. Some studies have found similar results for other corporate 
announcements (Hotson et al., 2007). Examples include studies by Keown and Pinkerton 
(1981), who looked at the daily stock price movements between 1975 and 1978 for 194 
successfully acquired firms and concluded that trading occurs on nonpublic information 
prior to the merger announcement, by Ke, Huddart, and Petroni (2003) who studied 
309 190 trades between 1989 to 1997 and found evidence of US insiders selling shares 
prior to an unfavourable earnings announcement, and  by John and Lang (1991), who  
found that the share price effect of a dividend announcement is influenced by the extent 
and direction of the insider trade prior to the dividend announcement10. 
The ability for outsiders to mimic insider trades and still earn profits while all (relevant) 
information is made public implies that markets are not semi-strong form efficient11. In 
the US, which has the most extensive director dealings study database, studies by Seyhun 
(1986) and by Rozeff and Zaman (1988), found that outsiders are unable to earn excess 
returns, net of transaction costs. This indicates that the US market exhibits the semi-
strong form of market efficiency. Other US studies by Bettis et al. (1997) and King, Roell, 
                                                          
10 John and Lang (1991) found that an increase in dividends and insider holdings (prior to the dividend 
announcement) more than was expected by the market lead to a greater positive share price effect. 
Likewise if there are an increase in dividends but a decrease in insider holdings (prior to the dividend 
announcement) then a negative share price effect was observed. 
11 Defined as discussed in the introduction under EMH. 
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Kay, and Wyplosz (1988), however, find that the converse is true, and that both insiders 
and outsiders can earn abnormal returns, net of transactions costs. This, in turn, points to 
the US market not being semi-strong form efficient.  
Givoly and Palmon (1985) found that companies traded by insiders do not show 
particularly positive/negative information signals, including earnings and dividend 
announcements, post the director’s trade.  
A more recent study conducted in the UK (Fidrmuc et al., 2006) found that market 
participants could still made gains mimicking director dealings, despite earlier information 
being announced about the prospects of the companies these directors were trading in. 
This could imply that insiders believe directors may know even more than what is released 
to the public via normal announcements.  
2.1.2. Contrarian Investing 
As mentioned in the previous section, in the process of timing the market insiders trade 
as contrarian investors. Contrarian trades can be defined as those where the investor buys 
a share with a high book to market value (Rozeff and Zaman, 1998). A high book to market 
value means the accounting value (assets less liabilities as per the financial statements) is 
greater than the value of the share as priced by the market. This could mean the share is 
undervalued by the market and opens up an opportunity for investors to unlock value that 
is not already priced into the share value. Investors in these shares assume that the share 
price will increase to its fundamental value in the future (Mokale, 2010). A share which 
performed poorly in the recent past will in most cases have a high book to market value. 
Another ratio used to identify contrarian investments is a high cash flow to price ratio, 
which indicates a large amount of cash for future investment without increasing debt 
(Rozeff and Zaman, 1998). 
It is, however, not only insiders that trade in a contrarian manner. Outsides do as well, 
and this is an investment philosophy followed by many large asset managers. It can 
therefore be assumed that outsiders would earn the same abnormal profits as insiders 
did, if it was merely due to the contrarian nature of the insiders’ trades. However, a study 
done by Gangopadhyay, Ken and Sarwar (2009) in the US on director trades between 1999 
and 2002, found the excess returns earned by directors to be made up of two 
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components, namely (i) the return due to the contrarian nature of the investment and, 
(ii) the return due to trading on insider information. Shares purchased by directors were 
shown to earn a total return of 22.5% per annum more than shares sold by directors, with 
the difference still being 13.9% when the contrarian nature of the trade is excluded12. 
Therefore, the conclusion was that insiders do in fact earn a large percentage of their 
abnormal profits not only from trading in a contrarian manner, but also due to holding 
superior (inside) information. 
2.1.3. Director sales vs. director purchases 
A key question is whether directors’ sales provide as much information to the market as 
directors’ purchases do. Although directors may sell shares when they have information 
that could cause the share price to fall in the future, other reasons for selling, which do 
not provide additional information about the share or the underlying company to the 
market, include the exercise of options, personal liquidity needs, and tax timing issues. 
Many international studies therefore address this issue. 
In most cases it was found that director purchases led to higher abnormal returns than 
director sales, seemingly therefore being more reliable in providing insider information to 
the market. Relevant studies in the US supporting this view include those by King, et al. 
(1988) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001), and in the UK those by Gregory et al., (1997), Hillier 
and Marshall (2002) and Fidrmuc, et al. (2006).  
However, a few studies, such as those by Pope, Morris and Peel (1990) in the UK and Neill 
et al. (2008) in Australia found the opposite result, namely that director sales led to higher 
abnormal returns than director purchases. Mordant and Muller (2003) in South Africa 
found that whilst director sales earned abnormal returns, director purchases did not. 
                                                          
12 The study by Gangopadhyay et al. (2009) found insiders selling, more than buying, when their company 
had a high price-to-earnings multiple (P/E) and a low book-to-market (B/M) ratio. These criteria where used 
to find that the insiders were contrarian. However, if the insider trades on insider information they may or 
may not be contrarian. Piotroski and Roulstone (2005), basing their study on US market data between 1992 
and 1999, similarly found that insider purchases were positively related to B/M (an indication of a contrarian 
approach), and future earnings performance (an indication of insider trading). 
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There are therefore opposing thoughts as to whether (i) director sales or purchases in 
their own company’s shares earns a higher abnormal profit, and (ii) whether outsiders 
should mimic merely the insider sales or purchases, or both, or neither. 
2.1.4. Period over which abnormal returns are earned 
Studies have used various event window periods13 when investigating the ability for 
insiders, and outsiders, to earn abnormal returns from director trades. Some prior studies 
suggest the event window should be no longer than 10 days, or the model itself will lose 
its power (Kothari and Warner, 2004), whilst other studies are of a short term nature  as 
they found that outsiders’ ability to earn abnormal returns dimish significantly once 
insiders transactions are made public (Dickgiesser and Kaserer, 2009). 
Some studies consider both the short and long term abnormal returns earned by insider 
trades. Neill et al., (2008) investigated cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) earned on the 
Australian stock exchange at predefined intervals between the transaction date and 120 
days thereafter. CARs where earned for both inside purchases and sales from the 
transaction date (T) through to T+1, T+5, T+30, T+60, T+90, T+ 120 days thereafter, except 
for T+1 for insider sales. CARs rose to 3.98% and 9.39% for the period T+120 days. A study 
performed by Biesta, Doeswijk and Donker (2003) on the Dutch stock exchange found 
abnormal returns earned both in the short term and long term. CARs earned at T+21 were 
2.23% for purchases and 1.91% for sales, whilst CARs earned T+120 were 11.3% for 
purchases and 2.4% for sales.  
Other studies have focussed more on the long term abnormal profits earned from  insider 
trades, including the studies done by Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Purkis in 1994  on the 
UK market between 1984 and 1986, as well as the subsequent study done byGregory, 
Matatko, Tonks and Purkis in 1996 on the UK market between 1986 and 1990. These 
studies found that significant monthly abnormal returns  were earned for up to 24 months 
post an insider buy trade, whilst abnormal returns earned from a sell were only significant 
in the initial period. 
                                                          
13 The event window, as discussed later under the methodology section, refers to the period of days prior 
(20 days) and post (20 days) the event day over which the analysis is performed. 
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One of the issues with using a longer period is the possibility of the findings being affected 
by other outside factors (noise) which could result in the incorrect conclusions being made 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Other studies therefore focus only on the shorter term 
analysis of the CARs. Two often cited UK studies analysed firms on the London Stock 
Exchange. Hammil, Mcinkenny and Opong (2002) considered  only the period ten days 
post the share dealing date, and found signficant CARs for purchases (reaching 1.06% at 
10 days post trade) but not for sales, whilst Friederich et al. (2002) used a twenty day 
period post the share dealing date and found significant CARs for purchases (up to 1.46% 
and 1.96% at 10 and 20 days respectively) and sales (up to 1.07% and 1.46% at 10 and 20 
days respectively). 
However, there is still significance to the results that are determined when looking at the 
longer, and shorter, period for abnormal returns. 
2.1.5. Large vs. small cap firm insider abnormal returns 
The majority of international studies undertaken found that insiders do earn abnormal 
profits, as mentioned above, with a number finding that directors dealing in small cap 
firms earned larger abnormal returns than those of larger firms14. The possible reasons 
advanced for the above finding can be summarised as: (i) larger companies are subject to 
more public scrutiny by analysts and other market participants, which results in the 
directors having much less valuable inside information relative to the market when 
compared to directors of small companies, (ii) smaller firm directors are generally more 
familiar with the operations and future prospects of the company (one such reason 
includes directors of smaller companies being more involved in the day to day running of 
their companies), (iii) larger firms have more non-executive directors who are less 
intimate with the firm’s operations and, (iv) larger firm directors face greater scrutiny in 
terms of their transactions by the public and regulators, and thus they generally trade 
less/smaller amounts in their own firm. In addition the share price of larger firms will react 
                                                          
14 For examples of director dealings in small cap firms earning larger abnormal returns than those in large 
cap firms in various international markets see the following studies: Seyhun (1986), which looks at 
approximately 60,000 insider trades between 1975 and 1981 in the US, Hillier and Marshall (2002),which 
looks at 7,392 insider trades between 1992 and 1996 and Gregory et al. (1994) which looks at 1,653 non 
option related insider trades between 1984 and 1986 (both UK), Etebari et al. (2003) which looks at 2,453 
insider trades between 1995 and 2001 in New Zealand, and Neill et al. (2008) which looks at 8,053 insider 
trades between 2002 and 2006 in Australia.  
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quicker due to their listed nature, thus reducing any abnormal gains available to directors 
(Gregory et al., 1994). 
The higher returns earned by directors invested in smaller firms may, however, be due to 
the small firm effect (Fama and French, 1992). Gregory et al. (1994) incorporated thin 
trading into their methodology and found that much of the abnormal returns associated 
with small cap companies disappear once liquidity effects are accounted for. The study 
found that abnormal returns are higher for smaller firms, but when the correct benchmark 
is utilised, the abnormal returns earned by directors all but disappear. In a more recent 
study Ek and Erlinder (2015) found abnormal returns were still available for insiders 
trading in small cap firms, even after making adjustments for thin trading, or comparing 
the results to a small cap specific index.  
There are a number of issues with small cap firms that impact the findings and would 
otherwise incorrectly show differences in the abnormal returns earned between small and 
large cap firms. These issues include: (i) small cap share trades may be infrequent resulting 
in monthly returns being calculated off incorrect prices (i.e. the issue of low share 
liquidity), (ii) small cap firms generally outperform large cap firms and thus the ‘abnormal 
return’ may be due to the small firm effect (Fama and French, 1992), and (iii) liquidity 
issues may result in larger transaction costs, created by wider bid-ask spreads (Glosten 
and Milgrom, 1985; and Gregory et al., 1994). Another theory put forth by Banz (1981), 
which he acknowledged as conjecture despite being consistent with the empirical results 
of his study, is that investors, if faced with differing levels of information in firms, would 
limit their exposure to smaller cap firms, as there is generally less information available in 
the public space regarding these smaller cap firms. In another of Banz’s studies (Banz, 
1980), it was shown that if only a subset of investors were interested in a share, then on 
average it would provide higher risk adjusted returns than shares that attracted the entire 
market. Therefore, as there is less information regarding smaller cap firms available in the 
public space, this will result in increased risk adjusted returns, similar to the conclusion 
drawn by Gregory et al. (1994). 
Differing results have been found in other studies, however. For example, interviews 
conducted with key players of the Australian finance industry found that insider trading 
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was focussed on smaller speculative stocks, mostly by directors (Tomasic and Pentony, 
1991). 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001), while examining insider trading in all companies traded on the 
NYSE (New York Stock Exchange), AMEX and Nasdaq between 1975 and 1995, did not find 
major market movements around the trades, meaning outside investors initially 
dismissed the information provided by the director trade. However, where abnormal 
returns were earned it was invariably higher for smaller firms. At least 55% of the sample 
firms experienced insider trading (buying or selling). However, insiders of larger firms 
were more active, with at least 72% of these firms experiencing some form of insider 
trading. 
Perhaps one of the more conclusive studies conducted on the effect of firm size on 
abnormal returns was that of Ek and Erlinder (2015) , who  conducted their analysis on 
Sweden’s OMX NASDAQ Stockholm. These authors formed clusters based on firm size 
(large, medium and small), and found that Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) 
were earned in varying degrees based on firm size. It was found that hypothetical 
outsiders basing their trades on insider transactions were not able to earn abnormal 
returns for sales or purchases of large cap companies, but were able to earn abnormal 
returns of up to 2.89% for sales in mid cap and 1.66% for small cap companies, and up to 
0.37% for purchases in medium cap, and 1.75% in small cap companies. The study 
focussed on the short term, with the window stretching to a maximum of 10 days post 
the trade. 
2.1.6. The link between industry category and insider trade profitability 
Two papers have reported findings on the link between abnormal returns and industry 
classification. The first of these was an investigation into insider activity on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange (Cheuk, Fan, and So, 2006), and the second a recent study by Ek and 
Erlinder (2015) conducted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange’s NASDAQ OMX.  
In their study Cheuk et al. (2006) conclude that, regardless of industry, insiders were able 
to earn some form of abnormal returns. However, the magnitude of these returns were 
substantially different depending on the company’s industry classification. Insiders 
dealing in financial companies earned the highest abnormal returns (2.8% in the 20 days 
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following an insider trade), whilst at the other end of the scale insiders dealing in hotels 
earned a largely insignificant abnormal return.  
Ek and Erlinder (2015) divided their firm sample according to the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB), which is a global classification standard classifying firms into 10 industry 
groups. The NASDAQ OMX Stockholm is dominated by industrials (a fourth of all 
companies), financials and technology firms. The study found that the abnormal returns 
earned in Oil & Gas companies varied between 2.73% and 7.9% in the 10 day event 
window following the announcement of an insider purchase, whilst Health-Care was the 
only other industry classification for which statistically significant abnormal returns can 
be earned by outsider purchases. In terms of insider sales announcements, only Basic 
Materials (3.46%), Technology (1.82%), and Consumer Goods (2.96%), allowed for 
statistically significant abnormal returns to be earned. 
2.2. South African insider trading studies  
The first significant study into insider trading in South Africa (Mordant and Muller, 2003), 
investigated, firstly, whether directors earned abnormal returns on their insider trades 
and, secondly, whether outside investors could mimic insider trades to build a profitable 
trading strategy.  
The first half of the study concluded that abnormal returns are available to directors 
(trading in their company) by timing the market; however the majority of the cumulative 
annual returns (CARs) were due to the size, value and the resource nature of the shares.  
The conclusion to the second half of Mordant and Muller’s (2003) study was that outsider 
investors were unable to earn a profit by mimicking the insider trades. The ability for 
outsiders to mimic insider trades to earn abnormal profits was investigated in more depth 
in the unpublished studies of Nair (2008), Mokale (2010), and Moodley, Muller and Ward 
(2014). The study by Moodley, Muller and Ward (2014) concluded, contrary to Mordant 
and Muller’s study’s (2003) findings, that outside investors can earn abnormal profits by 
mimicking director dealings; going further by identifying the optimal director dealing 
investing strategy on behalf of the outsider. The final results of Moodley, Muller and 
Ward’s 2014 study gave an optimal lead up time (period to observe director dealings and 
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base investment decision on), hold period (time to hold the director dealing based 
portfolio), and market cap of the portfolio for both a buy and sell portfolio.  
In addition, the study by Mordant and Muller (2003) found that, contrary to the majority 
of the international studies on director dealings and their effect on share price, that 
director sales earned higher CARs than director purchases, with Ismail’s 2016 unpublished 
study drawing the same conclusion. However, another South African unpublished study 
by Mokale (2010) found the contrary true, with CAARs being 0.72% and 0.44% for 
purchases and sales transactions respectively. 
Previous South African studies focussing on director dealings neglected to discuss the 
impact of the size of the firm on the ability for directors to earn abnormal earnings, due 
to the liquidity issues associated with smaller firms. Mokale (2010) focussed only on the 
top 40 JSE-listed companies, Ismail (2016) and Nair (2008) the top 100, and Mordant, 
Muller and Ward (2014) the top 160 JSE listed companies by market cap, whereas this 
study will look at all the JSE listed firms irrespective of size. 
A further unpublished South African study, (van der Plas, 2007), focussed on other insider 
trading issues which, although not the topic of this paper, provide interesting additions to 
the JSE insider trading issue. One area of investigation was the occurrence of insider 
trading in the period preceding the announcement of a corporate action, including 
takeover, delisting and share buy-back transactions of 30 companies listed on the JSE. The 
study found significant share price run-ups in the acquired company in the event window 
period prior to public announcement; with 8% of the eventual offer premium anticipated 
to be due to the pre-bid run-up - a clear indication of possible insider trading. 
2.3. Literature summary 
The ability of directors to earn abnormal returns, and the ability of outsiders to mimic 
director’s trades to earn abnormal returns, has internationally been studied from a 
number of different angles, resulting in very different conclusions at times. Of all these 
studies, only a handful have considered  the relationship between company size or 
industry classification and abnormal returns related to director dealings. Furthermore, in 
South Africa very little research has been done on directors’ dealings in general, and none 
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on the abovementioned relationships. It is this gap in the literature that this study seeks 
to fill.  





3.1.      The following data was collected for this study: 
i) Population: Although directors’ dealing are reported through the JSE’s SENS 
platform, there is no standardised format for these text-based announcements, 
and they are therefore only available as text files. Furthermore, they are typically 
searchable by company within the standard market databases. In order to deal 
with this severe data limitation, several large text files containing all directors’ 
dealings SENS announcements for the period 01 January 2007 to 31 December 
2012 had previously been obtained from Sharenet. These text files were then 
converted to a usable Excel format via an extensive data cleaning process, 
involving both programing15 and manual steps.  
 
As far as possible all the director trades of all the companies listed on the JSE were 
included in the sample, thereby making use of the census method, which negated 
bias caused by picking out random samples. The data included the company name, 
value of the director’s trade, the nature of the trade (whether the transaction was 
a purchase or sale), as well as the date the transaction took place (the “transaction 
date”) and the date the transaction was announced on the JSE’s SENS platform 
(the “announcement date”). Because of the JSE’s insider trading regulations (see 
Section 1.1.3), in the vast majority of cases the above two dates were no more 
than two days apart.   The raw sample, before the data cleaning process described 
below16, consisted of 10,094 director trades made between 1 January 2007 and 
31 December 2012. 
 
ii) JSE Constituents: The names of all companies listed on the JSE Main Board at the 
end of each quarter over the period 01 January 2007 and 31 December 2012 was 
sourced from Thomson Reuters Datastream.   Data collection on a quarterly basis 
                                                          
15 My thanks goes to A/Prof Ryan Kruger, who did most of the Excel programming work for the conversion. 
16 The raw data had previously been cleaned to remove any options. 
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was done, so as to remove any survivorship bias that may exist due to companies 
entering and exiting during the period of investigation.  
 
iii) Unit of Analysis: For the shares of the 314 companies which had director trades 
over the period of investigation, the daily total return index values (used to 
calculate the daily total returns) for the period 1 January 2004 to 31 December 
2013 was obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
 
iv) Benchmark data: The daily total return index values for the All Share Index (J203) 
was obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream for the period 1 January 2004 to 
31 December 2013. The daily total return values for the FTSE/JSE Top 40 Index 
(J200), FTSE/JSE Mid Cap Index (J201), FTSE/JSE Small Cap Index (J202) and 
FTSE/JSE Fledgling Index (J204)17 was obtained from Bloomberg (Electronic 
Database) for the period 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2013. 
 
v) JSE Size Classification and Market Capitalisation: In order to categorise each 
company as a fledgling, small, medium or large cap firm18 so as to match it to its 
appropriate benchmark, the JSE Quarterly Review, which discloses the current 
index and market capitalisation for all companies listed on the JSE main board for 
each quarter end, was consulted.  
According to the JSE system the 40 largest companies by market cap are listed as 
large cap, the next  60 largest firms by market cap as medium cap, the following 
60  as small cap, and the remainder classified as fledgling (Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange, 2012).  
 
 
                                                          
17 Closing share prices Index values were used instead of total daily return index values for the J200, J201, 
J202 and J204 due to access issues around these benchmarks’ total returns. 
18 The categorisation of companies was done on a quarterly basis with the quarter ends set at 31 March, 30 
June, 30 September, and 31 December. 
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Table 3 - JSE Indices: Source JSE (2016) 
JSE Index Index Code Universe No. of Firms Index Review 
All Share (ALSI) J203 JSE Main Board 160* Quarterly** 
Top 40 J200 J203 40 Quarterly** 
Mid Cap J201 J203 60 Quarterly** 
Small Cap J202 J203 60* Quarterly** 
Fledgling J204 JSE Main board Not fixed Annual*** 
* These numbers vary over time, whereas the number of companies in the TOP 40 and Mid Cap 
indices are fixed. 
** Quarterly – March, June September and December  
*** Annual –December 
 
vi) Firm Classification: The complete list of JSE listed companies and their industry 
classification in line with the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), was obtained 
from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The nine classifications were basic materials, 
consumer goods, consumer services, financials, industrials, health care, 
technology, telecommunications, and oil and gas.  
3.2.  Data cleaning and preparation: 
As mentioned above, the raw data consisted of 10,09419 director transactions on the JSE 
between the 1 January 2007 and 31 December 2012. However, certain adjustment and 
exclusions were necessary in order to render the data suitable for analysis. The following 
was process was therefore followed: 
- If a firm had more than one transaction on a day, only the largest transaction by value 
for a specific company on a specific day was used in the analysis, and all the other 
transactions were removed from the sample. This resulted in 5,569 transactions 
remaining in the sample.  
                                                          
19 In line with past international (Gregory et al., 1994, and Neill et al., 2008) and South African (Nair, 2008 
and Mokale, 2010) studies, the exercise of options were removed from the data set before the 10,094 figure 
was obtained. This was done as the exercise of options generally do not convey to outsiders the director’s 
thoughts on the prospects of the company, but is rather directors exercising their options due to stipulated 





- Thereafter, in line with previous studies (e.g. Klinge, Seifert and Stehle, 2005) any 
overlapping transactions were removed from the sample. An overlapping transaction 
was classified as one where there was an insider transaction made in the same firm 
within 20 days on either side of the announcement date. This was done to remove any 
incorrect correlation between transactions relating to the same company, which in 
turn will result in incorrect variances in the CAAR being calculated in the event studies 
to follow.  
 
- Any director’s trade where the company’s complete daily total returns were not 
available for the entire period between 20 days before and 20 days after the event 
date were next removed20, as these returns were required to calculate expected 
returns. This resulted in 906 transactions being removed from the sample. 
- Any director’s trade where the company’s complete daily total returns were not 
available for the period 21 to 230 days before the event date were removed. Where 
the share was not traded on a day the return was denoted as a 0% total return value 
in the data. However, where shares were not listed at all for a part of the above period 
before a director’s trade, the trade was removed from the data set. This is because 
the beta calculation which forms part of the methodology requires the entire period 
of daily total returns for the 21 to 230 day period before the event date. This resulted 
in 252 transactions being removed from the sample.  
- Once the above removals had been made, the remaining transactions were tested to 
identify which shares were too illiquid for the purposes of the analysis. Thus, on the 
assumption that a zero daily return usually indicates no trades on a particular day, 
shares with more than 20% of their daily returns being zero over the period 21 to 230 
days before the event date, were excluded from the sample. This removed 2,493 
additional transactions from the sample, thus reducing the sample to 1,026 
transactions. The majority of the transactions removed for liquidity issues related to 
                                                          
20 Certain daily returns were not available simply because some shares do not trade every day, yet these 
shares were not excluded. Only shares were all the daily returns were missing during the 20 days before 
and 20 days after the event date were removed. 
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small cap (689), and fledgling firms (890)21. Only four transactions relating to Top 40 
firms were removed, which is expected as they are the largest and generally most 
frequently traded firms on the JSE. A further 193 transactions relating to mid-cap firms 
were removed with the other transactions linked to firms without a size classification. 
 
Figure 1: Transactions with 20% or more daily total return value of zero in the 
estimation window 
As shown in Table 4 below, the final data set consisted of 1,026 director transactions 
across 136 companies, of which of 463 were purchases and 563 sales. 
Table 4 - Summary of Director Dealings Data Set used 
  Purchases Sales 
2007 78 96 
2008 87 37 
2009 74 89 
2010 88 89 
2011 82 141 
2012 54 111 
  463 563 
                                                          
21 The firms falling into the Fledgling Index are by nature the smallest and the least liquid. The firms are not 
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4. Research Methodology 
The next section will cover the methodology used in the study. 
4.1 Event Study Methodology 
This study made use of the event study methodology in line with the majority of the 
international studies covering insider trading. Event study methodology has been in 
existence since the 1930s, and was brought into the finance realm by Fama, Fisher, Jensen 
and French (1969). It has subsequently been widely used when identifying share price 
movements caused by a particular event (Binder, 1998). Event study methodology has 
therefore become the standard for this type of analysis. 
Event studies’ central theme is the calculation of the abnormal return, which is defined as 
the difference between the actual return and the expected return (usually on a listed 
share). The expected return is the normal return calculated off a selected model. The 
abnormal return calculated around the event date is indicative of the extent of market 
inefficiency, as abnormal returns should not exist in an efficient market (Kothari and 
Warner, 2004). 
The commonly accepted event study flow, also used in most academic studies on which 
this study is based (e.g. MacKinlay, 1997, and Mokale, 2010), is as follows: 
4.1.1 Identify the event  
The event (defined as Day0 in the event study) was identified as the date a director’s trade 
in the shares of his/her own JSE listed company was announced on the JSE’s SENS 
platform. There was a choice of two event dates for each transaction: the date of the 
actual director trade, and the date of the trade being publically announced through SENS. 
Using the former would statistically address whether or not directors earn abnormal 
returns from insider trades, whereas using the SENS announcement date would 
statistically investigate if outsiders can earn abnormal returns by mimicking insider trades 
when reacting on this information immediately.  Either choice would, however, indirectly 
answer both questions, especially as the JSE requires a firm to disclose directors’ inside 
trades within 48 hours. In the analysis of the results it was therefore implicitly assumed 
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that director trades took place between day -2 and day -1 in relation to the event date 
(SENS announcement date). To test this assumption, the SENS announcement and 
transaction dates for the sample of 1,026 director transactions were compared. Outliers 
were removed, namely where the SENS date was listed before the transaction date (5 
transactions), and where the SENS announcement date was greater than 20 days post the 
transaction date (31 transactions). For the remaining 990 transactions (96.5% of the 
sample), the SENS announcement date occurs on average 1.96 days post the transaction 
date22. In line with this the transactions date will be assumed to take place 2 days before 
the SENS announcement date (defined as Day0). 
 
4.1.2 Define the event window  
The event window was made up of two periods, namely the period before the trade, and 
the period post the trade. The pre-event window encompassed the 20 days preceding the 
event day, i.e. Day-20 to Day-1. The post-event window encompassed the 20 days post the 
event day, i.e. Day1 to Day20. According to MacKinlay (1997), including a pre-event window 
allows for the analysis of the pre-event returns, and may help in understanding whether 
outsiders received inside information prior to the event. 
The present study considered the potential short term abnormal returns earned on 
director dealings, and hence the post-event window was set at 20 trading days, which is 
in line with the South African study done by Mokale (2010), but did not consider the long 
term, as done by Mordant and Muller (2003) and van der Plas (2007). By restricting the 
post-event window to a relatively short period, external market forces are largely 
removed from the results, and the test statistics’ sensitivity to the assumptions 




                                                          
22 Of the 990 remaining transactions, 701 less than two days from transaction to SENS announcement, 126 





4.1.3 Estimation window and returns estimation 
MacKinlay (1997) suggested using either the Constant Mean Return Model or the Market 
Model to determine the expected return of the company in relation to the market. The 
Constant Mean Return Model uses a constant expected return for the firm relating to the 
period under review, which is in turn compared to the actual return observed to calculate 
the abnormal return per company. The expected return for each company is calculated 
separately, with this expected return remaining constant for the period. This does not 
have much relevance to reality. The Market Model, however, uses a linear relationship 
between the return of the market and the return of the individual company. The model 
uses an estimation period to calculate an approximation for the expected (normal) returns 
to be used in the calculation of the abnormal returns earned by directors. As the Constant 
Mean Return Model is rather restrictive, it was decided to use the Market Model for the 
analysis as it allows for the individual security’s responsiveness to insider trades, as 
measured by beta. This is in line with international studies, including those of Ek and 
Erlinder (2015), Neill et al.,(2008), and Cheuk et al. (2006).  
In this study the Market Model was therefore used to regress each share’s returns 
individually against the All Share Index (ALSI), used as proxy for the market return, to 
calculate the share’s beta value. This in turn is  used to calculate the expected (normal) 
return for each of the companies in the sample.  
Although most earlier studies made exclusive use of Market Model, a single factor market 
model, Van Rensburg and Slaney (1997) demonstrated that a two-factor Arbitrage-Pricing 
Theory (APT) model, consisting of the returns of the JSE’s resource and financial-industrial 
indices, may better represent the return generating process of the South African market 
(Van Rensburg, 2002). However, previous South African studies (see, for example, Kruger 
and Toerien, 2014, and Ismail, 2016) found little significant difference in the results 
obtained from the Market Model and APT approaches. In view of this, and due to its 
simplicity and wide use in the academic field, it was therefore decided to use only the 
Market Model in this study.  
It is important to select an estimation window that is of sufficient length in order to best 
calculate the beta for each firm. MacKinley (1997) suggested 120 days as the minimum 
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for an estimation window, and most studies use anything from 180 to 250 days including 
SA studies by Nair (2008) and Ismail (2016). In this study 220 days was used, with the 
estimation window therefore running from -230 to -21 days in relation to the event date. 
 
Figure 2: Estimation and Transaction Window 
 Figure 2 summarises Sections 4.1.1 – 4.1.3 of the methodology section. Day 0 is the event 
day (SENS announcement date), and day -2 the assumed director’s transaction date (48 
hours before the SENS announcement date required by the JSE listing requirements). The 
estimation window, day -230 to day -21, was used to calculate a separate beta for each 
company (by regressing the total daily returns of the company against the benchmark), 
which was thereafter applied to the market’s return going forward to calculate the 
expected returns of the companies during the transaction window. This is done at each 
event date, and thus a rolling beta is calculated, which is more representative of current 
economic and market conditions. The expected return is then compared to the actual 
return of the firm’s share to get the abnormal return for the company’s share over the 
transaction window period. The transaction window is broken up into two sections, the 
pre-event period, which demonstrates the share’s behaviour before the director traded, 
and the post-event period, which is used to calculate the potential abnormal returns 
earned by outsiders mimicking director’s trades (director’s abnormal returns earned are 
calculated from day -2 until day 20). 
The methodology section will next discuss how this study respectively approached the 
issues of sales vs. purchases, market capitalisation, and industry classification, before 




4.1.4 Purchases vs. Sales 
The majority of the international and South African23 studies dealing with director dealings 
have analysed the differences in abnormal returns earned by purchases and sales 
transactions, respectively, as they are expected to behave differently (buy transactions 
being seen as possibly a stronger signal than sell transactions, as explained earlier). The 
current sample comprised of 463 purchases and 563 sales transactions. It must be noted 
that where two transactions in the same firm occurred on the same day only the first, 
ranked by size, was included. This was done before arriving at the sample of 1,026 
transactions, and may have meant the filtering out of certain purchases/sales. 
Sale transactions (55%) outnumbered purchase transactions (45%), in line with previous 
South African studies done by Ismail (2016), Mokale (2010) and Nair (2008), where sales 
respectively made up 58%, 62% and 78% of the total transactions. This is contrary to many 
international studies, where purchase transactions were more common. For example, in 
the Swedish market Ek and Erlinder (2015) found that 58% of transactions were 
purchases, Neil, Sadeghi and Watts (2008) found a staggering 86% of transactions were 
purchases in the Australian marke,t and finally Seyhun (1985) found, in arguably the most 
comprehensive US study to date, that 70% of the 59,148 transactions analysed were 
purchases. Obviously these ratios are to some extent dependent on the period over which 
a study is conducted (i.e. bull markets vs. bear markets), but the contrast remains 
interesting.  
4.1.5 Market capitalisation 
The study followed the JSE guidelines for categorising the JSE Main Board according to 
market capitalisation, as follows: i) The largest 40 firms by market cap, as defined by the 
Top 40 Index (J200), ii) The next largest 60 firms by market cap, as defined by the Mid Cap 
Index (J201), iii) The following 60 firms by market cap, as defined by the Small Cap Index 
(J202), and iv) The remaining shares listed on the Main Board, but not included in the All 
Share Index (J203) are included in the Fledgling Index (J204).  
                                                          
23 International studies include Pope et al., (1990) and Seyhun (1986) and South African studies include 
Ismail(2016) and  Mordant & Muller (2003) to name a few in a long list. 
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A number of the firms from the data set were not classified by the JSE. To better analyse 
these firm’s director dealings it was necessary to allocate the firms to a size classification. 
The size allocation was done based on the market capitalisation of the firm at the previous 
quarter end, with the thresholds used based on the market capitalisations of firms already 
allocated to size classifications on the JSE. Firms were allocated as follows: (i) greater than 
R20 billion – Top 40, between R5 billion and R20 billion - Mid Cap, Between R2.2 billion 
and R5 billion – Small Cap, and below R2.2 billion – Fledgling. This resulted in a further 38 
transactions being assigned: 2 to Top 40, 31 to Mid Cap, 3 to Small Cap and finally 2 to the 
Fledgling classification. 
Table 5 – Director transactions broken down by company size 
 
Due to the length of the sample window a small number of firms may have migrated 
between indices as a result of relative market cap changes over the period. This was noted 
and the sample was revised quarterly to ensure that any firm that did not meet the 
requirements for one of the Indices, Small, Medium and Top40, was moved to the 
applicable Index during that quarter.  
4.1.6. Adjustment for thin trading: 
Due to the issues surrounding small cap firms and its effects on abnormal return 
calculations, the majority of studies dealing with insider dealings removed small cap firms 
from their population. This is, for example, the case with the prior unpublished SA studies 
of Ismail (2016), Mokale (2010) and Nair (2008). Other studies, however, have focused 
solely on small cap firms, including the international study by Hamill, Mcilkenny and Oping 
(2002). In accordance with the studies by Ek and Erlinder (2015) and Gregory,  et al., 1994), 
the current study investigated the link (if any) between a firm’s market cap and abnormal 
returns earned by directors, and hence thin trading is a pertinent factor to the study. 
Top 40 % Mid Cap % Small Cap % Fledgling % N/A % Total
2007 64 21% 59 13% 20 11% 17 10% 14 8% 174
2008 27 9% 53 11% 21 12% 6 5% 17 14% 124
2009 50 16% 78 17% 22 12% 6 4% 7 4% 163
2010 49 16% 93 20% 35 20% 0 0% 0 0% 177
2011 69 23% 108 23% 43 24% 3 1% 0 0% 223
2012 47 15% 73 16% 38 21% 6 4% 1 1% 165
Total 306 464 179 38 39 1026
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On a calculation level, the effect of thin trading can be seen on the beta calculation. The 
beta used in the market model is calculated through the regression of the stock’s past 
returns against the market’s past returns; however thin trading results in an erroneous 
beta being calculated, which will result in an incorrect  expected return for the share being 
forecast (Sercu, Vandebroek, and Vinaimont, 2008). A share that does not trade on a 
particular day may reflect a zero return, but this is clearly in such a case not due to the 
underlying market fundamentals, but rather to the share price being carried forward from 
the previous day unchanged (Ryan, 2007). The resultant error causes the betas of active 
stocks to be biased upwards, whilst thinly traded stocks have a negative bias (Scholes and 
Williams, 1977). 
Various models have been introduced to try mitigate the effect of thin trading on the beta 
calculation. Stroll and Whaley (1990) suggest using longer holding periods; this does not 
reduce the noise created by thin trading, but does increase the true returns, thus 
providing a better signal-to-noise ratio.  
Dimson (1979) suggested the use of multiple regressions in an attempt to reduce the 
effects of thin trading.  The simple market model calculates beta using ordinary least 
squares simple regression. The expected value for the share is calculated using a weighted 
average of a sequence of true prices from the present and past. Dimson explains that to 
counter the issue of thin trading one must run multiple regressions of the share returns 
against lagged, matching and leading market returns. The beta is then calculated as an 
aggregate of these slope coefficients and in so doing ‘smoothes’ out the explanatory 
variable, the market return, over the three periods (Ryan, 2007). However, Dimson (1979) 
made use of monthly share and market returns in the calculation of beta, whereas it was 
decided for this paper to make use of the available daily stock returns as has become 
standard for short-term event studies since the mid-1980s (Sorokina, Booth, and 
Thornton, 2013). Therefore, this study rather individually removed those shares that 
failed to meet minimum liquidity criteria from the sample, which differs from prior South 
African studies, which tended to remove small cap shares as a group, without any 
reference to actual liquidity over the investigation period. As a result, this study retained 
sufficient small cap-related transaction to be able to address the research question 
mentioned above. In terms of the process followed, as was discussed in the Section 3.2, a 
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threshold was therefore set where any transactions with 20% or more zero daily total 
returns in the estimation window (day -230 to -21 relative to the event) were removed 
from the sample.  
Market proxies used in analysis: 
In addition to regressing the share returns against the ALSI, they were regressed to the 
applicable Index based on the company’s market cap. The Indicies included the J200 (Top 
40 Index), J201 (Mid Cap Index), J202 (Small Cap Index) and the J204 (Fledgling Index). For 
example, if a firm was classified as a Small Cap firm by the JSE, its share returns were first 
regressed against the ALSI for analysis, but in addition also against the J202 for additional 
insight.  
Using the ALSI as a market proxy for all four size classifications allowed for comparisons 
to be made between the abnormal returns earned by both directors and outside 
investors, for each size classification. This aproach takes the view that the ALSI is the 
appropriate market proxy, and assumes that an investor would be indifferent as to which 
one or combination of these categories to invest in. This was used to identify which size 
category of companies, by market cap provide the greatest abnormal returns potential for 
outsiders mimicking director trades.  
Share returns were also regressed against their associated market cap indices, in order to 
identify more accurately the abnormal returns for directors, and potential abnormal 
returns for outsiders, earned against similar sized companies. In other words, in this case 
the market (and hence market proxy) was considered to be the specific peer-group of 
companies by size. Practically, this implies a test for abnormal returns to outside investors 
who mimic director trades only within a previously selected company size (market cap) 
category. 
4.1.7 Industry classification 
The second major addition made to the South African literature on insider trading by this 
study is the effect of the firm’s industry classification, as per the JSE, on the ability of 
insiders to earn abnormal returns. As discussed under the introduction section, there are 
no South African studies, and as far as the author is aware, only two international studies, 
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Cheauk, Fan and So (2006), and Ek and Erlinder (2015), that investigated the effect of the 
firms industry classification on the ability for directors to earn abnormal returns by trading 
in their companies’ shares. 
There may be an effect on the abnormal returns experienced by respective director trades 
in each of these JSE sectors due to their relevant sector classification. Therefore the 
sample was split according to their industry classifications as per Ek and Erlinder’s (2015) 
study. Thereafter the realised returns earned by the insiders were compared to the 
expected returns earned based on the market return (J201). The ICB industry classification 
used in Ek and Erlinder’s (2015) study included the following groups: financials, telecom, 
basic materials, consumer services, industrials, technology, consumer goods, oil and gas 
and health care (only 9 groups were included as utilities only comprised of 2 companies 
in their sample). 
The above breakdown was also used to classify all the firms in the current sample of 
director dealings. 
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The first step was to predict the normal outcome (normal returns) during the event 
window in the absence of the event.  The normal returns were calculated using the actual 
share and All Share Index (ALSI) returns (in addition to the various indices used for the size 
effect analysis).  
Thereafter, the abnormal outcome within the event window was calculated as the actual 
return earned by the director’s trade less the predicted (or normal) return earned during 
the event window. The predicted (or normal) return is the expected return as if no event 
had occurred. 
The abnormal return was calculate by comparing the expected return of the share to the 
actual return of the share. The expected return is calculated by using the Market Model 
to regress the share return against the market return within the estimation window. The 
cumulative average return was calculated as the sum of the actual return earned by the 
director’s trade less the sum of the market’s return.  
A step by step breakdown of the calculation of the cumulative average abnormal returns 
is presented below. 
i) Total share returns: 
The share’s total daily return was  calculated by dividing its closing total return index value 
for dayt+1 by its closing total return index value for dayt. The resultant value gave the total 
daily share return, consisting of both the index price movement and any dividend 
declarations. 
Rit = (Rt/Rit-1)        (Equation 2) 
Where Rit is the total actual return for the company for the period t, Rt is the actual share 
index value at time t (the current day), and Rt-1 is the actual share index at time t-1 (the 






ii) Cumulative actual share returns (CASR): 
The cumulative share return is then calculated as the daily total returns summed over the 
event window. 
CASRt = ∑ 𝑛 Ri,t         (Equation 3) 
 
iii) Actual market returns: 
The total daily market return was calculated by dividing the ALSI’s24 closing index value of 
dayt+1 by the ALSI’s closing index value of dayt.  
Rmt = (Rmt/Rmt-1)        (Equation 4) 
iv) Calculation of Parameters, αj and βj:  
The estimation window, day -230 to day -21 in respect to the event day 0, was used to 
calculate the parameters, αj and βj, to be used in the market model. 
Rjt = αjt + βjRmt + ϵjt       (Equation 5) 
Where Rjt is the daily total return for the company j for the day t, αjt is the estimated 
intercept, and Βj the estimated market risk for the company j (The sensitivity of the 
company’s share price to the market return). The daily actual return for the ALSI25 for the 
period t is represented by Rmt. ϵjt is the error term for the day t. This is assumed to be 
normally distributed with a mean of zero and a constant variance 𝜎𝑗
2. 
v) Abnormal returns: 
The abnormal return for each firm were then calculated daily for the 20 days preceding 
and succeeding the event by comparing the actual share’s total return to the estimated 
share’s total return, based on the Market Model predicted return using the beta and 
market return described above.  
ARjt = Rjt - αj - β j Rmt       (Equation 6) 
                                                          
24 For the size analysis section of this study this was done for the J200, J201, J2202, J203 and J204. 
25 For the size analysis section of the study the ALSI (J202) was replaced by the relevant size benchmark, 
J200, J201, J202 or J204. 
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Where ARit is the abnormal return for period t, and Rit the actual total return for the firm 
for the period t (Refer to Equation 2). β j represents the estimated market risk for the 
company j (the sensitivity of the company’s share price to the market return), and Rmt is 
the daily actual return for the ALSI for the period t (refer to Equation 4). The time/period 
is denoted by t. 
vi) Average abnormal returns: 




)    ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡𝑁𝑖=0         (Equation 7) 
Where AARt is the average abnormal returns for all the shares during period t, N the 
number of transactions in the sample26, and ARit the abnormal return for period t (Refer 
to Equation 6). 
vii) Cumulative average abnormal return: 
These are a cross section average of the cumulative abnormal returns, and are the sum of 
all the single abnormal returns. They were calculated as the sum of the abnormal returns 
for all the companies in the sample over the chosen period27. 
CAARt = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡          (Equation 8) 
Where CAARt is the cumulative average abnormal returns for all the shares during period 
t, D  the day in the period which the average abnormal returns are being calculated for, 
and AARit is the average abnormal return for period t (refer to Equation 7). 
4.3 Statistical tests of significance: 
In accordance with most studies in this field, the t-test was used to test for statistical 
significance.  
The two-sided t-test requires the observations to follow a normal distribution. The null 
hypothesis (H0) states that insiders are unable to earn abnormal returns (CAAR), as these 
are not significantly different to zero, whilst the alternative hypothesis (H1) states that 
                                                          
 
27 The total sample comprised of 1,026 transactions which were further sub divided into purchases (463) 
and sales (563) transactions, and yet further by firm size and firm industry classifications. 
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insiders are able to earn abnormal returns significantly different to zero. A two-sided t-
test was done at the 5% significance level, as the abnormal returns could be either positive 
or negative. The test statistic is calculated as follows: 
tCAAR = 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅/(√𝑇2 − 𝑇1 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅) 
Where tCAAR is the T-Stat. CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal returns for all the 
shares during period t. √𝑇2 − 𝑇1 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅 is the standard deviation of the sum of AARs for all 
the shares during period t.  




5. Results and Discussion 
As was previously stated, the purpose of the study was twofold: firstly to identify if 
directors earned abnormal returns by trading in their firms, and secondly whether 
outsiders could mimic these director trades to earn an abnormal return themselves. 
Abnormal returns from directors are centred around day -2, the assumed average 
transactions date, while the earliest outsiders could act on the director’s trade is day 0, 
the SENS announcement date. The results of interest are the CAARs earned from day -20 
through to day 20 (the event window). The discussion of the results is divided into three 
sections, as follows: 
 The comparison between CAARs resulting from director purchases vs. director sales, 
as well as the mimicking thereof, 
 The effect of company size on the CAARs resulting from director trades, as well as the 
mimicking thereof, and 
 The effect of company industry classification on CAARs resulting from director 


















5.1 Purchases vs. Sales 
As done in the majority of director dealing studies the starting point for discussing the 
empirical findings is that of purchases vs. sales.  
5.1.1 Combined Purchases and Sales 
  
Figure 4: CAAR's for Director Purchases and Sales Combined  
Figure 4 shows the combined CAARs earned for directors’ sales and purchases. Abnormal 
returns earned from directors’ sale transactions have been multiplied by -1 and added to 
those of directors’ purchase transactions to get the combined CAARs. A negative purchase 
CAAR before day -228 does not signify a loss for a director, rather it shows the negative 
CAARs the director avoided by not holding the share until day -2. For sales the CAARs are 
inverted (due to multiplying them by -1, for this graph alone) and are therefore positive 
leading up to day -2 in Figure 4, which signifies directors were able to earn positive 
abnormal returns, while holding the share and avoiding the subsequent losses by selling 
the shares at day -2. Post day -2 an increasing CAAR signifies positive abnormal earnings 
for the director. 
                                                          
28 Going forward it is assumed director trades take place on day -2 with directors earning the CAAR on day 
-2 as if they invested at the start of the day (48 hours pre the SENS announcement which occurs on the 
morning of day 0). By implication outsiders are able to trade on the information at the start of day 0 and 





















All three (combined, purchases and sales) CAARs follow a similar trend line, with directors 
transacting at day -2 and earning positive abnormal returns from day -1 onward. The 
abnormal returns level out for purchases after day 9. However, this is not the case for 
abnormal returns earned on sales, resulting in the combined CAARs trend line continuing 
upward until the end of the event window. There are abnormal returns available for 
outsiders mimicking both purchases and sales, with the combined abnormal return 
available to outsiders being 0.94% (an annual equivalent of 17.62%) in the 20 days 
following the event day. The possible abnormal returns for outside investors mimicking 
director trades are statistically significant throughout the post event date period at both 
the 5% and 10% significance levels (see Table 6). 




Figure 5: CAAR's for Director Purchases 
Combined
0-5 2,93 0,03 Significant Significant
6-10 9,93 0,00 Significant Significant
11-15 8,48 0,00 Significant Significant
16-20 14,59 0,00 Significant Significant





























Figure 5 shows the CAARs earned for purchases. Directors are assumed to trade on day -2, 
with outsider investors able to mimic these trades on day 0, the event date. The period 
before day -2 signifies the movement in total returns of the companies before the 
directors purchase the shares. It is important to note that the point corresponding to day 
-2 in Figure 5 represents the CAAR at the end of day -2, and not the return at the start of 
day -2, hence the reason for an abnormal return being recorded on day -2 for directors 
(the green line in Figure 5 beings at 0% for the close of day -3). The total returns decline 
sharply from day -17 until day -2 where they reach -1.75%. Directors trade at the start of 
day -2, earning the negative AAR on day -2, however this then turns positive from day -1, 
increasing until day 10, where after CAARs remain relatively flat with a slight downward 
trend (ending the event window at -0.84%).  
The change in the direction of the CAARs on the day of the director purchase (day -2) can 
indicate one of two things - either (i) directors are able to use their superior inside 
information to time the market nearly perfectly, thus allowing them to earn abnormal 
returns prior to this information being made public (Uylangco et al., 2010), or (ii)  the 
private information of the director’s trade is leaked to the market prior to the SENS 
announcement made on day 0, allowing outsiders to immediately mimic directors’ 
purchases in the belief (correct or not) that they convey superior information on the 
prospects of the firm. 
As discussed above it is important to note that the point corresponding to day -2 in Figure 
5 represents the CAAR at the end of day -2, and not the return at the start of day -2. What 
is therefore interesting to note is that day -2 is the lowest point in the CAAR line, implying 
that directors still earn negative AARs for day -2, and that positive AARs only commence 
from day -1 onwards. If it is true that a director’s trade is leaked to the public, this one 
day delay before the share price increases could be the result of the time it takes for this 
information to get to the market, and for outside investors to react to it. Another reason 
for the change in the CAARs direction only after day -2 is that the change in CAARs is due 
only to momentum trading and without the momentum provided by outside investors, 
directors would not be able to earn abnormal returns (Givoly and Palmon, 1985).  
As shown in Figure 5, outside investors, by mimicking directors’ purchase transactions as 
soon as they are made public (day 0), are be able to earn CAARs of 0.78% between day 0 
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and day 20 (an annualised figure of 14.54%), with the possibility of earning a maximum of 
0.97% if they were able to exit the position following day 12. The abnormal returns are 
statistically significant for outside investors mimicking director’s share purchasing across 
all four (see Table 7). 




Figure 6: CAAR's for Sales 
Days -20 to -3 represent the returns earned by directors while holding the share of their 
company, with directors selling the share on day -2. Between days -20 and -8 the sale 
transactions’ CAAR fluctuate between 0.07% and -0.09%, before a strong increase 
between days -7 and -2, which peaks at 0.59% on day -2. As was the case for the purchase 
transactions, a change in direction of the CAARs is found after day -2. The negative trend 
in CAARs from day -1 reflect the losses directors avoid by selling their shares before their 
Purchases
0-5 2,64 0,05 Significant Significant
6-10 3,56 0,02 Significant Significant
11-15 9,02 0,00 Significant Significant
16-20 4,10 0,01 Significant Significant
































total returns decline.  Outsiders are able to sell their shares, in line with the director’s 
trade on day 0, and negate the fall in CAARs as signified by the red line in Figure 6. As was 
the case for purchase transactions, (i) outsiders are assumed to trade on the belief that 
directors have more insight and are aware when a firm’s share price is likely to fall due to 
adverse information, and (ii) the CAARs shift direction before the news of the director’s 
trade becomes public knowledge by means of a SENS announcement on day 0. 
The graph indicates that directors are able to time their trades, selling their shares when 
the CAARs are at their second highest (a CAAR of 0.53% from day -20) and before they fall 
post day -2. After day -2, the sale transactions’ CAARs are on a clear downward trajectory 
throughout the event window.  
Outsiders would best be served mimicking the directors’ sale trade immediately, as the 
information becomes available, as the CAARs continue to fall post day 0, falling 
significantly post day 3, with CAARs of 0.33% and 0.22% at days 3 and 4 respectively. By 
mimicking directors’ trades outsiders are still able to earn healthy abnormal returns, 
despite the two day delay in director trade information becoming available to them. In 
line with previous studies done by Mordant and Muller (2003) and Pope et al. (1990), it 
appears that director sales provides a greater opportunity for outsiders to earn abnormal 
returns than director purchases, yielding a possible abnormal return of 1.06% (annualised 
return of 20.20%) (either through short selling, or through the avoidance of losses), 
compared to a return of 0.78% (annualised return of 14.54%) for purchases. The abnormal 
returns are only not significant at the 5% significance level for outsiders mimicking 
director’s sale trades for the day 0 to 5 and 6 to 10 day periods, otherwise they are 
significant. 
Table 8: Significance of Outsider Investors CAARs for Sale Transactions 
 
Sales
0-5 2,26 0,07 Not Significant Significant
6-10 2,38 0,08 Not Significant Significant
11-15 3,37 0,03 Significant Significant
16-20 15,14 0,00 Significant Significant
10% Significance 
Level





5.2 The link between company size and director dealing CAARs 
Unlike prior South African studies, this study considered the effect of the firm’s size on 
the abnormal returns earned. Each size classification (Top 40, Mid Cap, Small Cap and 
Fledgling) will be looked at separately in turn, with each discussion split into two sections: 
(1) where the firms returns are compared to that of the ALSI to calculate the beta and 
abnormal returns, and (2) where the firms returns are compared to the Index 
corresponding to the firm’s size classification on the JSE to calculate the beta and 
abnormal returns. The findings from each step will be compared to see if they differ. 
Part 1, as defined above, will directly compare the abnormal returns earned by directors 
across the four size categories, which is made possible by keeping the benchmark 
constant. Part 2 will attempt to identify whether an outsider wishing to invest in a specific 
one of the four size sectors will be able to earn abnormal returns by mimicking director 
transactions within that specific size category. This is done by using the relevant size 
sector index as market proxy when determining share betas. 
5.2.1 Using the ALSI as a market proxy 
By using the ALSI as a market proxy the results of each classification can be compared to 
identify which provides the greatest abnormal returns to directors and possibility for 
outsiders to mimic. Because the Top 40, Mid Cap and Small Cap groups were found to 
behave quite differently to the Fledgling group, the former three are discussed first. 
 




















Figure 8: CAAR's for Mid Cap firms (ALSI used as market proxy) 
 
Figure 9: CAAR's for Small Cap firms (ALSI used as market proxy) 
 
a) Purchases  
The Top 40, Mid Cap and Small Cap purchase transaction CAARs graphs (Figures 7, 8 and 9) 
follow a similar trend to that of the total purchase transaction CAARs graph (figure 5). These 
three graphs show a general decline in CAARs until day -2, before reversing from day -1 
onward. This trend, however, appears increasingly pronounced as one moves down the size 
categories, and as a result the positive AARs earned by directors vary according to the size of 











































abnormal returns on the two days (day -1 and 0) following their purchase: 0.39% and 1.13% 
respectively. Directors of Top 40 firms earn negative abnormal returns for days -2 and -1, and 
only once their transaction becomes public knowledge on day 0 are positive abnormal returns 
earned. This could imply that directors of Top 40 firms are more aware of the consequences 
of being implicated in releasing any non-public information to the public as they, and their 
company, are more closely followed and any illegal dealings will draw attention and possible 
prosecution. Directors of Top 40 and Mid Cap companies experience a tapering off of AARs 
following day 4 and day 3, respectively, culminating in a return reversal for Top 40 shares by 
day 20. The CAARs associated with Small Cap company share purchases continue to increase 
throughout the event window, resulting in directors earning 3.44% (71.13% annualised) by 
purchasing their company’s shares on day -2 and holding them until day 20. 
All three purchase transactions CAARs graphs indicate the ability for directors to time their 
purchases (within a day), indicated by the subsequent upward trend in the CAARs graph after 
the assumed purchase day (day -2), and the opportunity for outsiders mimicking directors’ 
purchases by purchasing at day 0 to earn positive CAARs.  
Outside investors purchasing shares in Small Cap companies stand to earn the highest CAAR 
of 3.25% - an annualised figure of 79.40%. For Top 40 and Mid Cap companies the equivalent 
numbers are 0.14% and 0.60%, respectively, although for Top 40 companies the CAAR peaks 
at 0.55% on days 5 and 13. The substantially larger abnormal returns earned for Small Cap 
firms compared to Mid Cap and Top 40 firms can possibly be explained in terms of Small Cap 
firms not being as closely monitored by investment managers and other investors, and hence 
the existence of greater informational asymmetry between the director and the market. 
b) Sales 
The Top 40 and Mid Cap sale transaction CAARs graphs (Figures 7 and 8) follow a similar trend 
to that of the total sale transaction CAARs graph (Figure 6), with CAARs increasing between 
day -20 and day -2 (the assumed date of sale). For Small Cap shares, however, CAARs over 
this period show a slight declining to flat trend. Directors of Top 40, Mid Cap and Small Cap 
companies all earn abnormal returns by selling their shares at day -2, and hence avoiding the 
subsequent decreases in CAARs. To the end of the event window these are, respectively, 
1.02%, 0.59% and 1.41% for Top 40, Mid Cap and Small Cap companies. Directors and outsider 
investors who mimic director sale transactions in the Top 40 and Mid Cap companies 
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experience a levelling out of CAARs post their transactions, with CAARs plateauing until day 8 
and 9 respectively. Outsiders are again able to obtain information from director’s trades, 
earning 0.87% and 0.80% for Top 40 and Mid Cap sale transactions between day 0 and 20. 
Once again outsiders are able to earn the highest CAARs in the Small Cap classification by 
mimicking director trades, with the possibility of earning 1.53% (an annualised figure of 
30.12%) by selling their shares on day 0. 
 
c) The Fledgling Group 
 
Figure 10: CAAR's for Fledgling firms (ALSI used as market proxy) 
The sample of fledgling directors’ trades was very small (a mere 20 transactions), and the 
graph above is therefore included only for the sake of interest. As can be seen, there is no 
indication of directors being able to time the market, or signalling much useful information to 
outsiders trough their trades.  Other than the small sample size, it is possible that this result 
could be due to fledgling companies being so risky and young, that even insiders have limited 

























d) Summary (ALSI used as market proxy) 
Table 9- Summary of Director and Outsider’s annualised abnormal returns 
 
Table 9 indicates the annualised abnormal returns available to directors, trading at day -2 
and holding the position until day 20, as well as the possible annualised abnormal returns 
available to outsiders by mimicking the directors’ trades at the event date (SENS 
announcement date). As can be seen, outsiders earn a higher possible abnormal return 
than those earned by directors across the majority of the sub samples29. This could be due 
to the exact timing of trade, with directors assumed to trade at the start of day -2 (exactly 
48 hours before the SENS announcement) throughout the study, whereas in reality it 
could be anytime within 48 hours before the SENS announcement date. Another reason 
                                                          
29 It has been assumed in all cases that trades take place in the morning of each day, which would be in line 
with the timing of the SENS announcements. This would mean that on average directors’ and outsiders’ 
returns would begin on day -2 and 0, respectively, due to the assumptions used earlier in the study. 
Purchases Rank Sales Rank Combined Rank
Total 10,31% 17,32%
Size
Top 40 -1,15% 3 17,39% 3 16,05% 4
Mid Cap 7,56% 2 9,77% 4 18,02% 3
Small Cap 71,13% 1 24,88% 2 112,13% 1
Fledgling -26,96% 4 83,32% 1 35,51% 2
Purchases Rank Sales Rank Combined Rank
Total 14,54% 20,20%
Size
Top 40 2,52% 3 16,23% 4 19,13% 4
Mid Cap 10,89% 2 14,81% 3 27,20% 3
Small Cap 74,47% 1 30,12% 2 125,17% 1
Fledgling -29,62% 4 90,04% 1 35,49% 2
Directors (Day -2 to +20)
Outsiders (Day 0 to +20)
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may be due to the momentum of the market, which may take an additional day to react 
entirely to the director’s trade, as the distribution of the information is not perfect (nor 
should it be, as it is illegal before day 0). This sequence can be practically illustrated using 
the sub-sample of Small Cap purchase CAARs (using the ALSI as a benchmark) as an 
example. In this case the AARs are negative until, and including, day -2 (0.37%). However, 
on day -1 they become positive (0.56%). This one-day lag observed in many of the cases 
investigated, could be due to news of the director’s trade slowly filtering into the market 
during the course of day -2, allowing outsiders to only trade on this information on day -
1, which then drives up the price of the shares and therefore the CAARs, resulting in 
positive CAARs on day -1. Note that this all occurs before the SENS announcement on day 
0. However, outsiders acting on the information at day 0, despite not participating in the 
positive AARs of day -1, have also avoided the negative AARs of day -2, and therefore only 
collect the positive AARs earned in the period from day 0 to 20. 
With the exception of Top 40 and Fledgling purchases, Table 9 indicates that the South 
African listed equity market does not appear to be strong form efficient, as directors are 
able to earn abnormal returns, presumably on the information they have access to as a 
result of their positions within their firms (Neill et al., 2008). Table 9 also shows that if 
outsiders were to mimic director trades, they would be able to earn abnormal returns for 
all the sub-samples, except for Fledgling purchases. This indicates that the South African 
market is not semi-strong form efficient either, as outsiders are able to earn abnormal 
returns by basing their investing strategy on that of directors’ trades, which are public 
information as from day 0. These results are pre transaction costs which may alter the 
findings (Seyhan, 1986). 
Director sales transactions provided larger abnormal returns than that of purchases. 
Directors were able to earn an annualised abnormal return of 10.31% and 17.32%, for 
purchases and sales transactions respectively between days -2 and 20 (a 23 day period), 
in line with the UK study done by Gregory et al  (1994). The returns available to directors, 
and possible for outsiders by mimicking director trades, is the highest for Small Cap firms 
for both purchases and sales, with purchases providing the highest annualised return 
(71.13% for directors). This is in line with the belief that directors of smaller firms hold 
more valuable information on the operations and prospects of their firm, and that the 
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purchase of shares by a director indicates a their belief that the firm is undervalued in 
relation to future prospects. Directors of Mid Cap firms earn similar abnormal returns for 
both purchase and sale transactions in their firms. However, directors of Top 40 firms are 
unable to earn abnormal returns on their purchases (-1.15% annualised for the 22 days 
after the trade, vs. a healthy 17.39% for sales). This could indicate that in most 
circumstances directors are not selling their shares for liquidity and tax issues, but rather 
as a result of private information indicating a potential decline in the share price of the 
firm. Outsiders would therefore be best served to follow the sales, rather than the 
purchases, of Top 40 directors. 
The summary will now look at the CAARs per 5 day window following the event date, 
which by implication focuses on the ability for outsiders to earn abnormal returns based 
on directors’ trades, as the event date is the earliest possible date outsiders should be 
able to mimic these trades. 
 
Figure 11: Purchase CAARs for Size Classification (Outsiders) 
Figure 11 indicates which size firms provides the highest CAARs from the SENS 
announcement date. Across all four intervals (day 5, 10, 15 and 20), Small Cap firm 
purchase transactions provide the largest opportunity for outsiders to earn abnormal 
Day 5 Day 10 Day 15 Day 20
Top 40 0.34% 0.24% 0.38% 0.14%
Mid Cap 0.54% 0.64% 0.70% 0.60%
Small Cap 1.91% 2.30% 2.90% 3.25%














Purchase CAARs - Size Classification                        
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returns. This is in line with the hypothesis that these firms are not followed as closely by 
larger asset managers and investors, and that their director trades therefore have greater 
informational value compared to that of larger companies (Gregory et al., 1997). Similarly, 
although Top 40 and Mid Cap firm purchase transactions provide a similar CAAR profile, 
Mid Cap transactions consistently provide higher CAARs across the four intervals. Top 40 
firms are generally the most traded of all the firms on the JSE and hence are the most 
monitored by the likes of investment managers and individual investors alike. This means 
any information signalled by director’s trades is that much less significant (than for smaller 
firms), as many of the investors have already obtained this information through their own 
research. 
 
Fledgling firm transactions provide CAARs higher than Top 40 firm purchase transactions 
from day 0-10, but thereafter declines drastically to -2.00% by day 20. As mentioned 
previously, this could be due to the very small sample size or the high risk nature of 
fledgling firms, which could make investing by their directors largely speculative. 
 
Figure 12: Sale CAARs for Size Classification (Outsiders) 
Outsider investors for all four sub categories would do well to mimic the sale trades of 
directors, with Figure 12 indicating directors do hold superior knowledge regarding the 
Day 5 Day 10 Day 15 Day 20
Top 40 0.15% -0.52% -0.82% -0.87%
Mid Cap -0.25% -0.17% -0.51% -0.80%
Small Cap -0.99% -1.29% -1.63% -1.53%












Sale CAARs - Size Classification                       
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firm and are able to time the selling of their shares before the CAARs fall, for Top 40 and 
Mid Cap firms, and even further for Small Cap and Fledgling firms. 
 
 
Figure 13: Combined CAARs for Size Classification (Outsiders) 
The overall CAAR graph above attempts to combine the effect of the purchase and sale 
transactions for each separate size classification category. The sale transaction CAARs 
were multiplied by -1 and added to that of the purchase transaction CAARs. The CAARs 
earned by Small Cap transactions post the event date is the highest, with positive high 
CAARs in each of the 5 day periods post event date. The results indicate that directors in 
Small Cap firms are able to earn large abnormal returns by purchasing and selling shares 






Day 5 Day 10 Day 15 Day 20
Top 40 0.19% 0.76% 1.20% 1.01%
Mid Cap 0.79% 0.81% 1.21% 1.39%
Small Cap 2.90% 3.59% 4.53% 4.78%





















0-5 0,79 0,47 Not Significant Not Significant -0,60 0,57 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 0,51 0,64 Not Significant Not Significant 1,83 0,14 Not Significant Not Significant
11-15 0,96 0,39 Not Significant Not Significant 3,89 0,02 Significant Significant
16-20 0,45 0,68 Not Significant Not Significant 3,78 0,02 Significant Significant
Mid Cap
0-5 2,17 0,08 Not Significant Significant 1,06 0,34 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 1,84 0,14 Not Significant Not Significant 1,00 0,37 Not Significant Not Significant
11-15 4,88 0,01 Significant Significant 1,61 0,18 Not Significant Not Significant
16-20 4,23 0,01 Significant Significant 4,39 0,01 Significant Significant
Small Cap
0-5 3,50 0,02 Significant Significant 3,15 0,03 Significant Significant
6-10 4,11 0,01 Significant Significant 4,40 0,01 Significant Significant
11-15 7,11 0,00 Significant Significant 2,46 0,07 Not Significant Significant
16-20 10,18 0,00 Significant Significant 4,65 0,01 Significant Significant
Fledgling
0-5 0,52 0,63 Not Significant Not Significant 0,16 0,88 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 0,20 0,85 Not Significant Not Significant 1,04 0,36 Not Significant Not Significant
11-15 -0,77 0,49 Not Significant Not Significant 0,73 0,50 Not Significant Not Significant















0-5 0,30 0,77 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 1,96 0,12 Not Significant Not Significant
11-15 2,00 0,12 Not Significant Not Significant
16-20 4,28 0,01 Significant Significant
Mid Cap
0-5 2,40 0,06 Not Significant Significant
6-10 3,47 0,03 Significant Significant
11-15 2,91 0,04 Significant Significant
16-20 5,75 0,00 Significant Significant
Small Cap
0-5 4,12 0,01 Significant Significant
6-10 5,09 0,01 Significant Significant
11-15 6,66 0,00 Significant Significant
16-20 10,13 0,00 Significant Significant
Fledgling
0-5 0,33 0,76 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 0,99 0,38 Not Significant Not Significant
11-15 0,20 0,85 Not Significant Not Significant











Table 10 shows the results of the significance testing done at both a 5% and 10% 
significance levels on purchases, sales and the combined purchases and sales for outsiders 
mimicking directors’ trades in the 20 days following the event date. Where a p-value is in 
red, underlined and in bold it signifies the abnormal returns are statistically significant 
during the period at that significance level. The abnormal returns available to outsiders 
mimicking insider trades in small cap companies, for both purchases and sales and these 
two combined, are significant across all 4 periods. 
 
The abnormal returns outsiders can earn mimicking insider trades in Top 40 companies 
are mostly not significant except for sale transactions in the 11 to 15 and 16 to 20 day 
periods, and the combined transactions in the 16 to 20 day period at both significance 
levels. For Mid Cap companies insiders’ abnormal returns available are significant across 
all three categories in the 16 to 20 day period (the only period where the sales are 
significant at either level) and significant at both 5% and 10% significance levels for all 
periods for combined transactions except day 0 to 5 for the 5% significance level. 
 
5.2.2 Using the applicable size indices as market proxies 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, as a robustness check for this part of the investigation (the 
link between CAARs and company sizes), the basic methodology was also repeated using 
the various applicable indices instead of the ALSI (J203) as market proxy when 
determining share betas. However, the results obtained by using the J203 as the market 
proxy were found to be almost identical to those obtained when using the J200 (Top 40), 
J201 (Mid Cap), J202 (Small Cap) ,and J204 (Fledgling) indices as the respective market 
proxies. Therefore, the trend lines were almost identical throughout, with the only 
variation being in the magnitude of the abnormal returns which, if anything, were slightly 
higher when using the firm size category index as the market proxy For example, outsiders 
mimicking director sales in the Small Cap companies group earned an abnormal return of 
1.53% using the J203 as a market proxy, but 1.84% if the J202 was used as market proxy. 
The graphs for the abnormal returns based on using the applicable size index as a market 




5.3 The link between industry classification and director CAARs 
The following section will discuss the results of the analysis into whether a firm’s industry 
classification affects the abnormal returns earned by insiders, and whether outsiders can 
mimic directors’ trades to earn abnormal profits. 
 
Unlike the size classification section that has gone before, firm returns were only 
compared to the ALSI to calculate the CAARs. 
 
 
Figure 14: Sales & Purchases CAAR's for Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
 








































Figure 16: Sales & Purchases CAAR's for Consumer Services 
 
Figure 17: Sales & Purchases CAAR's for Financials 
 






























































Figure 19: Sales & Purchases CAAR's for Health Care 
 























































Table 11: Purchases annualised CAAR's for the 7 Industry Classifications 
 
The purchase transactions’ CAARs for the Basic Materials and Oil & Gas, Consumer 
Services, Industrials and to a lesser extent Financials classifications follow a similar trend 
to the total purchase transactions CAARs for the entire sample as depicted in Figure 5. 
Thus, the CAARs follow a decreasing trend from the start of the event window, day -20, 
before reversing shortly after the director’s purchase on day -2. For Basic Materials and 
Oil & Gas, Consumer Services, Financials, Industrials and Technology & 
Telecommunications, negative AARs are again observed up to and including day -2, 
becoming positive from day -1 onwards. The implications previously discussed for the 
entire sample therefore applies at the individual industry levels as well. 
Basic Materials and Oil & Gas provide the largest post-trade CAAR, which peaks at 3.38% 
(89.85 annualised) CAAR at day 14 for directors who were able to time their purchase 
correctly by purchasing at day -1 (a 15 day window). The CAARs are slightly less if day -2 
is used as the director’s transaction date as assumed before. For this industrial group, 
outsiders have the opportunity to earn 3.26% by day 20 by purchasing shares in the 
industry at day 0 (an annualised return of 74.53%). It is not clear why this group of 
companies would deliver the best insider returns, but it could be that the market attaches 
particular value to insider signals sent within this industry. This is an untested view. 
The purchase transactions CAARs associated with directors trading in the Consumer 
Goods group (Figure 15), do not follow a definite trend line, but fluctuates throughout the 
event window period. However, upon closer inspection there are three trades which 
Purchases Rank Purchases Rank
Total 10,31% 14,54%
Industry
Basic Materials & Oil and Gas 51,90% 1 74,53% 1
Consumer Goods -11,60% 7 -19,02% 7
Consumer Services 12,78% 3 24,90% 2
Financials -0,10% 4 4,01% 4
Industrials 16,21% 2 11,89% 3
Health Care -6,61% 5 3,10% 5
Technology & Telecommunications -6,68% 6 -15,96% 6
Directors (Day -2 to +20) Outsiders (Day 0 to +20)
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appear to be outliers in this sub sample and skews the outcome. The CAAR spike at day -10 
is caused by a trade in AFGRI (AFI) with an associated AAR of 22.53% on day -10, the large 
dip on day 7 is caused by a trade in Steinhoff International (SHF) with an AAR of -10.44%, 
and the sudden uptrend at day 15 is caused by another trade in AFGRI (AFI) resulting in 
an AAR of 15.72%. The removal of the above three transactions see directors lose value 
on their purchase trade, particularly in the 3 days following the trade. 
Outsiders are able to potentially earn significant annualised abnormal returns mimicking 
directors in the Basic Materials & Oil and Gas (74.53%), Consumer Services (24.90%) and 
Industrials (11.89%) industry classifications. However, mimicking director purchases in the 
Technology & Telecommunications (-15.96%) and Consumer Goods (-19.02%, or -6.08% 
after removal of the 3 outliers disclosed above) groups, result in negative annualised 
abnormal returns. There are also abnormal returns available for outsiders mimicking 
Financial and Health Care firms’ director purchases, but their magnitude is dependent on 
when the outsider exits the position. For example, for Financial companies the annualised 
return is 4.01% if the position is held until day 20, but 17.78% if the position is exited at 
day 13, and for Health care it is  3.10% if the position is held until day 20, but higher (e.g. 
51.20% at day 9) if exited earlier. When mimicking directors’ trades in the Technology & 
Telecommunication industry, outsiders are limited to annualised positive abnormal 
returns only in the immediate short term by purchasing on day 0 and selling on days 2 and 
3  and then again between days 12 and 16. In summary, from the above findings, outsiders 
would do best by mimicking directors’ purchases in the short term for Basic Materials and 











Table 12: Sales annualised CAAR's for the 7 Industry Classifications 
 
All the sales sub-samples, as that split by industry, indicate the South African market is 
not strong form efficient, with directors able to earn abnormal returns. Furthermore, 
except for the financials industry, these abnormal returns are all in double figures. The 
sale transactions’ CAARs for the Basic Materials and Oil & Gas, Consumer Services and to 
a lesser extent the other classifications except for Consumer Goods, follow a similar trend 
line to the total sale transactions CAARs (see Figure 6) before the event date. The CAARs 
follow an increasing trend from the start of the event window, day -20, before reversing 
shortly after the director’s sale. As with purchases, Basic Materials and Oil & Gas CAARs 
remain relatively consistent between days -20 to -6 before a large increase in CAARs 
between days -5 and -2, leading up to the assumed director’s trade on day -2. The 
turnaround point in the CAAR graph is again before the SENS announcement date (with 
large positive AARs leading up to and including day -3 for Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
and Financials and day -2 for Consumer Services).  
 
The reversal in the AARs are not as consistent across the industries for sales as was the 
case for purchases. Directors selling their shares in Basic Materials & Oil and Gas 
experience an immediate reversal in AARs on day -2 (the CAARs are 1.90% at the director’s 
assumed sale date), however this then reverts back to positive AARs until day 5 (CAARs 
are 2.54% at the close of day 5). Therefore, by delaying their sale until day 5, outsiders 
would make a higher abnormal profit than insiders do when trading on day -2 (0.97% 
additional CAAR). AARs remain positive for the Consumer Services industry until day 0, 
Sales Rank Sales Rank
Total 17,32% 20,20%
Industry
Basic Materials & Oil and Gas 16,72% 3 11,80% 1
Consumer Goods 14,58% 6 13,52% 7
Consumer Services 15,37% 5 23,02% 3
Financials 6,79% 7 7,87% 6
Industrials 32,10% 1 41,67% 2
Health Care 16,18% 4 13,60% 5
Technology & Telecommunications 22,45% 2 22,05% 4
Directors (Day -2 to +20) Outsiders (Day 0 to +20)
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before becoming negative post the event date, resulting in a gradual increase in CAARs 
earned by directors, and by outsiders if trading at day 030. 
 
The CAARs related to the Industrial industry are unique in that directors would have 
experienced a decline in CAARs between day -20 and day -2 of -1.15%. However, if 
directors did not sell at day -2, but instead held the share until day 20, they would have 
lost an additional 1.77%. Likewise, outsiders would benefit from mimicking directors sell 
trades immediately, as holding onto the share until day 20 would result in them losing an 
additional 2.02% (an annualised figure of 41.67%, which is high). However, directors in 
this case do not time the market perfectly, as selling on day -2 as opposed to the day 
before the event window began (day -21) cost directors -1.15%. The same applies to the 
Health care industry, where selling on day -2 as opposed to day 20 results in a CAAR of 
0.95% for directors, but the CAARs lost by selling on day -2 as opposed to day -9 is 0.60%. 
Outsiders, by mimicking director’s sale transactions in the Health Care industry, would 
avoid a decline in CAARs of -0.74%, but could have earned superior returns by selling on 
day -11.  
 
On the other hand, the CAARs associated with Consumer Goods director sale transactions 
once again did not follow a particular trend during the event window, and hence seem to 
have little informational value. This could have been due to the small sample comprising 
of only 26 sale transactions.   
 
c) Combined purchase and sale CAARs 
Table 13:  Combined CAAR's for the 7 Industry Classifications at 5 day intervals 
 
                                                          
30 It is important to remember that a negative AAR is beneficial for a director post day -2 (and outsider post 
day 0) as it implies by selling their share they have avoided the negative AAR. 
Day 5 1,87% 0,70% 1,15% 0,71% 1,78% 1,06% 0,87%
Day 10 2,39% -0,79% 1,41% 0,62% 2,66% 1,26% 1,19%
Day 15 4,19% -0,64% 1,27% 0,79% 2,90% 1,32% 0,99%
Day 20 3,90% -0,47% 2,49% 0,66% 2,67% 0,91% 0,16%
Combined











Table 13 presents the combined abnormal returns earned by mimicking director’s trades 
on day 0 for both sales and purchase transactions (sales CAARs have been multiplied 
by -1). Mimicking directors’ sales and purchases in Basic Materials and Oil & Gas provide 
the largest opportunity to earn abnormal returns across each of the four interval points, 
namely day 5, 10, 15 and 20. Significant abnormal returns are also available within the 
Consumer Services group, particularly between days 0 and 5, as well as 15 and 20. 
Industrials is another sector that provides large abnormal return opportunities for 
outsiders.  
Consumer Goods is the only industry where outsiders would not earn CAARs by mimicking 
directors’ trades and reversing their position at any time during the event window, with a 
positive CAAR only available if the outsider exited their position at the 5 day interval. 
Table 14 Combined annualised CAAR's for 7 Industry Classifications 
 
The presence of abnormal returns for outsiders in six of the seven industry classifications 
(excluding Consumer Goods as per Table 14), is consistent with the results found by Ek 
and Erlinder (2015), who for Sweden found that the Oil & Gas group provided the largest 
CAARs. A direct comparison to the current study is difficult, as here the Oil & Gas and Basic 
Materials industries were combined due to the small nature of the Oil & Gas transaction 
sample. However, Basic Materials and Oil & gas did provide the largest CAAR in this study, 





Combined Rank Combined Rank
Industry
Basic Materials & Oil and Gas 76,60% 1 94,45% 1
Consumer Goods 1,40% 7 -7,93% 7
Consumer Services 29,98% 3 53,25% 3
Financials 6,69% 6 12,18% 5
Industrials 53,12% 2 58,16% 2
Health Care 8,57% 5 17,10% 4
Technology & Telecommunications 14,37% 4 2,77% 6
Directors (Day -2 to +20) Outsiders (Day 0 to +20)
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Table 15- Statistical significance of outsider investors’ CAARs 
 
Basic Materials 
and Oil & Gas
0-5 2,81 0,04 Significant Significant -2,43 0,06 Not Significant Significant
6-10 4,94 0,01 Significant Significant -0,56 0,61 Not Significant Not Significant
11-15 2,65 0,06 Not Significant Significant 4,47 0,01 Significant Significant
16-20 5,05 0,01 Significant Significant 1,32 0,26 Not Significant Not Significant
Consumer Goods
0-5 0,21 0,84 Not Significant Not Significant 0,65 0,54 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 -0,88 0,43 Not Significant Not Significant 0,58 0,59 Not Significant Not Significant
11-15 -0,55 0,61 Not Significant Not Significant 0,07 0,95 Not Significant Not Significant
16-20 -0,93 0,41 Not Significant Not Significant 0,62 0,57 Not Significant Not Significant
Consumer 
Services
0-5 5,39 0,00 Significant Significant 1,37 0,23 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 1,17 0,31 Not Significant Not Significant 2,53 0,06 Not Significant Significant
11-15 1,28 0,27 Not Significant Not Significant 2,17 0,10 Not Significant Significant
16-20 5,01 0,01 Significant Significant 3,78 0,02 Significant Significant
Financials
0-5 0,71 0,51 Not Significant Not Significant 1,24 0,27 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 1,76 0,15 Not Significant Not Significant 0,66 0,54 Not Significant Not Significant
11-15 1,98 0,12 Not Significant Not Significant 0,90 0,42 Not Significant Not Significant
16-20 0,83 0,45 Not Significant Not Significant 1,45 0,22 Not Significant Not Significant
Industrials
0-5 1,54 0,18 Not Significant Not Significant 1,81 0,13 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 2,13 0,10 Not Significant Significant 2,95 0,04 Significant Significant
11-15 2,23 0,09 Not Significant Significant 7,27 0,00 Significant Significant
16-20 1,92 0,13 Not Significant Not Significant 4,13 0,01 Significant Significant
Health Care
0-5 1,55 0,18 Not Significant Not Significant 1,24 0,27 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 1,18 0,30 Not Significant Not Significant 0,72 0,51 Not Significant Not Significant
11-15 0,42 0,69 Not Significant Not Significant 3,09 0,04 Significant Significant
16-20 0,27 0,80 Not Significant Not Significant 0,84 0,45 Not Significant Not Significant
0-5 -0,07 0,95 Not Significant Not Significant 1,25 0,27 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 -0,06 0,96 Not Significant Not Significant 1,56 0,19 Not Significant Not Significant
11-15 0,51 0,64 Not Significant Not Significant 0,70 0,52 Not Significant Not Significant
16-20 -0,97 0,38 Not Significant Not Significant 2,04 0,11 Not Significant Not Significant
5% Significance 
Level















Table 15 shows the results of the significance testing done at both a 5% and 10% 
significance level on purchases, sales and combined purchases and sales for outsiders 
mimicking director’s trades in the 20 days following the event date per industry 
classification. The abnormal returns available to outsiders mimicking insider trades in 
Consumer Goods, Financial, and Technology and Telecommunication companies, for both 
Basic Materials 
and Oil & Gas
0-5 1,45 0,21 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 23,39 0,00 Significant Significant
11-15 2,96 0,04 Significant Significant
16-20 6,51 0,00 Significant Significant
Consumer Goods
0-5 0,77 0,47 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 -0,44 0,68 Not Significant Not Significant
11-15 -0,36 0,73 Not Significant Not Significant
16-20 -0,34 0,75 Not Significant Not Significant
Consumer 
Services
0-5 3,48 0,02 Significant Significant
6-10 1,67 0,17 Not Significant Not Significant
11-15 3,47 0,03 Significant Significant
16-20 8,88 0,00 Significant Significant
Financials
0-5 1,00 0,36 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 1,27 0,27 Not Significant Not Significant
11-15 1,87 0,14 Not Significant Not Significant
16-20 1,29 0,27 Not Significant Not Significant
Industrials
0-5 1,83 0,13 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 4,79 0,01 Significant Significant
11-15 5,26 0,01 Significant Significant
16-20 4,31 0,01 Significant Significant
Health Care
0-5 1,53 0,19 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 1,41 0,23 Not Significant Not Significant
11-15 3,29 0,03 Significant Significant
16-20 0,93 0,41 Not Significant Not Significant
0-5 0,57 0,59 Not Significant Not Significant
6-10 1,47 0,21 Not Significant Not Significant
11-15 0,89 0,42 Not Significant Not Significant












purchases and sales as well as these two combined are not significant across all 4 periods 
at both the 5% and 10% significance levels.  
 
Outsiders mimicking insiders transacting in Basic Materials and Oil & Gas are able to earn 
statistically significant abnormal returns when mimicking insider’s purchase transactions 
in all but the 11 to 15 day period at the 5% significance level, whereas only day 11 to 15 
provide significant abnormal returns for outsiders mimicking directors sales in the sector 
at a 5% significance level; outsiders mimicking both director purchases and sales 
combined are able to earn significant abnormal returns for all but the 0 to 5 day period. 
For the Consumer Services only outsider’s mimicking of insider sales are not significant for 
the 0 to 5 day period at the 10% significance level, whilst outsider purchases, sales and 





6. Conclusion and suggestions for future research 
This study focussed on a number of new aspects of insider trading in the South African 
market, namely the relationship between size and/or industry classification of the firm 
and the abnormal returns earned by the directors trading in these companies. 
Furthermore, in contrast to most previous studies, this study did not only research the 
abnormal returns earned by directors, but also abnormal returns available to outsiders by 
mimicking the director’s trades. 
The results are consistent with international studies, indicating that directors are able to 
time the market, purchasing shares when their prices31 are the lowest and selling shares 
when their prices are at the highest. In terms of market efficiency, these results support 
the hypothesis that directors have superior knowledge gained by their close relationship 
with their firm, and therefore trade on information that is not yet available to the public. 
This is evident by the reversal in CAARs two days prior to the director trade SENS 
announcement date, which is approximately the time of the actual directors’ trades given 
the JSE listing requirement that a director’s trade be publically announced within 48 
hours. 
Outsiders have the opportunity to earn abnormal returns by mimicking director trades at 
their earliest possible opportunity, which theoretically is the date the trade becomes 
public knowledge by means of a SENS announcement. In the case of purchase transactions 
directors generally correctly predict a rise in CAARs when timing their purchases, whilst 
for sale transactions directors generally correctly predict a fall in the share price and thus 
exit their position in a firm at the optimal time. Sale transactions provided higher 
abnormal returns to directors than purchase transactions. This is to an extent in line with 
the prior South African studies of Mordant and Muller (2003) and Ismail (2016), who both 
found that director sales resulted in positive returns, but that purchases did not (or, when 
they did, the result was not statistically significant).  
The size of a firm plays a role in the level of abnormal returns earned by directors, as well 
as the abnormal returns earned by outsiders who mimic these trades. Directors of Small 
                                                          
31 Prices and CAARs are used interchangeably as majority of the CAARs are made up of price changes. 
72 
 
Cap firms earn significantly larger abnormal returns, although Top 40 and Mid Cap 
directors also earn positive abnormal returns. However, the CAARs earned by Top 40 
directors are relatively small, and could possibly even be reduced to zero by the 
transaction costs associated with these trades. Results for directors’ sales transactions 
were similar, again indicating the ability of directors to earn abnormal returns in Small 
Cap, Mid Cap and Top 40 firms, and directors of Small Cap firms once again earning the 
highest abnormal returns.  
Industry classification was also found to affect the abnormal returns available for 
directors, and hence also outsiders. Directors in Basic Materials and Oil & Gas earned the 
largest abnormal returns for purchases, with five of the other six industries investigated 
(the exception being Consumer Goods), also providing directors and outsiders an 
opportunity to earn abnormal returns. For all seven industries directors timed their sales 
to earn abnormal returns in the form of avoiding a fall in share prices. In this case, 
Technology & Telecommunications and Industrials provided the largest CAARs. 
In terms of market characteristics, the findings of this study is inconsistent with both the 
strong and the semi-strong forms of market efficiency for the JSE. Specifically, the results 
indicate that outside investors can use the information signalled by a director’s trade to 
formulate a profitable abnormal return-generating trading strategy. Furthermore, the 
information conveyed by small cap directors’ trades seems to contain more inside 
information than Top 40 firm directors’ trades, most likely because the information the 
Top 40 directors are acting on is generally to a far greater extent already in the public 
domain.  
Lastly, this study can be extended by investigating how transaction costs impact the ability 
of outsiders to earn abnormal profits. In addition, a short time horizon of 20 days either 
side of the event window was used. A longer time horizon may shed light on the effect of 
directors’ transactions, and the possibility for directors to earn abnormal profits into the 
long term. Finally the effect of momentum trading could be separated from the results in 
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Appendix 1 –Director Trades by company  
Appendix 1 shows the 1,026 director dealings classified by company. The CAAR column 
gives the summed AAR of each director dealing over the event window and averaged 
across the company (sales CAARs have been multiplied by -1). The Size listed in Appendix 
1 relates to the size of the company at the last director dealing in the sample (a * signifies 
a company moved between size classifications during the dates used in the analysis). 
Share: No. of Trades: CAAR: Size: Industry 
1TM 1 24,98% Fledgling Financials 
ABL 14 -0,92% Top 40* Financials 
ACP 6 1,08% Mid Cap Financials 
ADR 2 4,56% Small Cap Financials 
ADW 14 -9,62% NA Financials 
AEG 2 -1,30% Mid Cap Industrials 
AFE 5 -7,11% Mid Cap Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
AFR 8 -1,00% Small Cap Consumer Goods 
AFX 2 4,71% Mid Cap Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
AGI 2 -0,51% Fledgling Industrials 
AGL 1 0,28% Top 40 Health Care 
AIP 2 -4,25% Mid Cap Health Care 
ALT 1 -12,99% Mid Cap Consumer Goods 
AMA 1 2,28% Fledgling Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
AMS 10 2,55% Top 40 Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
ANG 4 -5,00% Top 40 Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
ANS 1 -23,58% NA Industrials 
APK 6 7,87% Small Cap Industrials 
APN 8 -2,50% Top 40* Health Care 
ARI 1 -9,35% Mid Cap Industrials 
ART 11 3,50% Small Cap Industrials 
ASA 10 0,33% Top 40 Financials 
ASR 4 4,61% Top 40 Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
ATN 15 -3,30% Mid Cap Industrials 
ATR 1 3,30% NA Consumer Goods 
AVI 3 16,37% Mid Cap Consumer Goods 
BAT 2 21,74% Small Cap NA 
BAW 14 -3,22% Mid Cap* Industrials 
BCX 1 13,07% Small Cap Financials 
BDM 1 -4,89% Fledgling Financials 
BFS 3 -6,96% NA Financials 
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BLU 5 -11,47% Small Cap* Technology and Telecommunications 
BSR 15 3,51% Small Cap* Industrials 
BVT 16 -1,66% Top 40 Industrials 
BWI 1 19,69% NA Consumer Services 
CAT 6 -1,49% Mid Cap Consumer Services 
CLH 10 7,85% Small Cap Consumer Services 
CLS 9 -3,54% Mid Cap* Consumer Services 
CML 3 11,37% Mid Cap* Financials 
CMO 1 -23,32% NA Health Care 
CMP 7 -4,28% Small Cap Health Care 
CPI 22 2,48% Mid Cap* Financials 
CPL 8 0,51% Mid Cap Financials 
CSB 2 6,98% Small Cap Industrials 
DAW 2 -3,36% Small Cap Industrials 
DGC 10 -3,51% Small Cap* Industrials 
DRD 9 8,17% Small Cap Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
DST 1 -7,03% Mid Cap Financials 
DSY 26 0,39% Mid Cap* Financials 
DTC 22 0,66% Mid Cap Technology and Telecommunications 
ELI 4 -4,68% Fledgling Industrials 
EMI 3 -0,17% Mid Cap Financials 
EOH 2 1,31% Small Cap Technology and Telecommunications 
EQS 2 6,39% Small Cap Industrials 
ESR 10 12,36% Small Cap* Industrials 
EXX 2 -9,94% Top 40 Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
FBR 21 0,05% Small Cap Consumer Services 
FSR 11 -1,18% Top 40 Financials 
GFI 13 3,28% Top 40 Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
GND 1 -2,62% Mid Cap Industrials 
GRF 5 2,93% Small Cap* Industrials 
GRT 23 -1,64% Top 40* Financials 
HAR 4 -4,76% Top 40 Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
HCI 5 1,71% Mid Cap NA 
HDC 4 -1,84% Small Cap Industrials 
HLM 6 -1,44% Small Cap* Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
HYP 6 -3,20% Mid Cap Financials 
ILA 1 6,04% Small Cap Consumer Goods 
ILV 7 -4,45% Mid Cap Consumer Goods 
IMP 4 2,13% Top 40 Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
INL 20 1,83% Top 40 Financials 
INP 1 4,49% Top 40 Industrials 
IPL 22 0,90% Top 40* Industrials 
IVT 2 8,82% Small Cap Industrials 
JDG 6 3,69% Mid Cap Consumer Services 
JSE 8 -1,72% Mid Cap* Financials 
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KIO 4 1,09% Top 40 Financials 
LBH 4 -1,91% Mid Cap Financials 
LEW 17 2,25% Mid Cap Health Care 
LHC 2 -2,78% Mid Cap Health Care 
MDC 20 -1,74% Mid Cap Health Care 
MMH 5 0,83% Fledgling Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
MMI 2 2,75% Mid Cap Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
MML 2 -6,14% Fledgling Consumer Services 
MND 3 -8,09% Top 40 Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
MPC 12 -3,74% Mid Cap Consumer Services 
MRF 1 -4,65% Small Cap Consumer Services 
MSM 9 3,62% Mid Cap Consumer Services 
MTA 2 0,76% Small Cap Consumer Goods 
MTN 8 6,02% Top 40 Technology and Telecommunications 
MUR 4 0,57% Mid Cap* Industrials 
NED 15 -0,86% Top 40 Financials 
NHM 2 -20,07% Mid Cap Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
NPK 8 -0,40% Mid Cap Industrials 
NPN 13 0,77% Top 40 Consumer Services 
NTC 19 2,00% Mid Cap* Health Care 
OMN 13 0,35% Small Cap Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
PET 4 -12,12% Small Cap Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
PFG 3 0,07% Mid Cap* Financials 
PGR 10 5,39% Small Cap* Financials 
PIK 9 0,22% Mid Cap* Consumer Services 
PNC 18 -6,80% Small Cap* Technology and Telecommunications 
PPC 2 3,00% Mid Cap* Industrials 
PSG 2 3,85% Small Cap* Financials 
PWK 16 2,08% Mid Cap Consumer Services 
RBP 5 2,67% Mid Cap Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
RBX 1 20,52% Mid Cap Financials 
RDF 16 -0,84% Mid Cap Financials 
REM 9 -0,51% Top 40 Industrials 
RES 16 0,57% Mid Cap Financials 
RLO 5 1,56% Mid Cap* Industrials 
RMH 3 0,70% Top 40 Financials 
SAC 9 -2,29% Mid Cap Financials 
SAN 3 1,73% NA Industrials 
SAP 14 -0,34% Mid Cap* Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
SBK 11 -2,22% Top 40 Financials 
SHF 22 -1,46% Top 40* Consumer Goods 
SHP 35 -1,27% Top 40* Consumer Services 
SIM 3 5,04% Mid Cap* Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
SLM 3 -4,23% Top 40 Financials 
SNT 10 -2,19% Mid Cap Financials 
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SNU 5 5,54% Small Cap* Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
SOL 12 -2,33% Top 40 Basic Materials and Oil & Gas 
SPP 7 -3,48% Mid Cap Consumer Services 
SSK 8 5,48% Small Cap Industrials 
SUI 12 -2,86% Mid Cap Consumer Services 
SYC 1 -0,24% Small Cap Consumer Goods 
TBS 5 3,31% Top 40 Consumer Goods 
TFG 10 -4,27% Mid Cap Consumer Services 
TKG 2 -8,90% Top 40 Industrials 
TRE 1 5,01% Mid Cap Consumer Services 
TRU 7 2,65% Top 40* Consumer Services 
VIL 1 -4,17% Fledgling Financials 
VKE 6 -0,26% Small Cap Industrials 
WBO 2 -4,12% Mid Cap Industrials 
WEA 4 3,13% NA Industrials 
WHL 24 -1,04% Top 40* Consumer Services 















Appendix 2 – Overall CAAR during Event Window 
 
AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%)
Day -20 -0,06% -0,06% -0,25% -0,25% -0,09% -0,09%
Day -19 -0,09% -0,16% -0,13% -0,38% 0,06% -0,03%
Day -18 0,04% -0,12% 0,11% -0,27% 0,02% -0,01%
Day -17 0,01% -0,11% 0,05% -0,23% 0,02% 0,02%
Day -16 -0,04% -0,15% -0,04% -0,27% 0,03% 0,05%
Day -15 -0,03% -0,17% -0,03% -0,30% 0,03% 0,07%
Day -14 0,01% -0,16% -0,08% -0,38% -0,09% -0,02%
Day -13 -0,01% -0,17% -0,06% -0,44% -0,02% -0,04%
Day -12 -0,07% -0,25% -0,10% -0,53% 0,09% 0,05%
Day -11 -0,01% -0,26% -0,03% -0,56% 0,00% 0,04%
Day -10 0,04% -0,22% 0,03% -0,53% -0,05% -0,01%
Day -9 -0,12% -0,34% -0,18% -0,71% 0,08% 0,07%
Day -8 -0,07% -0,41% -0,15% -0,86% 0,00% 0,07%
Day -7 -0,11% -0,52% 0,00% -0,86% 0,19% 0,27%
Day -6 -0,01% -0,52% -0,06% -0,92% -0,01% 0,26%
Day -5 -0,14% -0,66% -0,34% -1,26% -0,03% 0,23%
Day -4 -0,10% -0,76% -0,03% -1,29% 0,15% 0,38%
Day -3 -0,16% -0,92% -0,17% -1,46% 0,15% 0,53%
Day -2 -0,16% -1,08% -0,29% -1,75% 0,06% 0,59%
Day -1 0,06% -1,02% 0,13% -1,62% 0,00% 0,58%
Day -0 0,20% -0,82% 0,39% -1,23% -0,04% 0,54%
Day 1 0,07% -0,75% 0,07% -1,16% -0,06% 0,48%
Day 2 -0,02% -0,77% 0,01% -1,16% 0,04% 0,52%
Day 3 0,09% -0,68% 0,13% -1,02% -0,06% 0,46%
Day 4 0,16% -0,51% 0,20% -0,82% -0,13% 0,33%
Day 5 0,06% -0,45% 0,08% -0,74% -0,05% 0,28%
Day 6 0,06% -0,40% 0,06% -0,68% -0,06% 0,23%
Day 7 0,00% -0,39% 0,00% -0,69% -0,01% 0,22%
Day 8 0,00% -0,39% -0,16% -0,85% -0,14% 0,08%
Day 9 0,00% -0,39% 0,13% -0,72% 0,10% 0,18%
Day 10 0,06% -0,33% -0,04% -0,76% -0,15% 0,04%
Day 11 0,00% -0,32% 0,03% -0,73% 0,02% 0,05%
Day 12 -0,02% -0,34% 0,07% -0,66% 0,09% 0,14%
Day 13 0,06% -0,28% -0,01% -0,67% -0,11% 0,03%
Day 14 0,10% -0,18% -0,01% -0,68% -0,19% -0,16%
Day 15 0,04% -0,14% -0,05% -0,73% -0,11% -0,27%
Day 16 -0,03% -0,17% -0,17% -0,89% -0,09% -0,36%
Day 17 0,01% -0,16% 0,03% -0,87% -0,02% -0,38%
Day 18 0,01% -0,16% 0,01% -0,86% 0,00% -0,38%
Day 19 0,05% -0,11% 0,05% -0,81% -0,05% -0,43%




Appendix 3a –Combined CAARs during Event Window by Company Size  
 
Combined
AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%)
Day -20 0,05% 0,05% -0,30% -0,30% -0,23% -0,30% 0,62% 0,62%
Day -19 0,01% 0,07% 0,01% -0,29% -0,32% -0,54% -0,77% -0,15%
Day -18 -0,23% -0,17% 0,23% -0,06% 0,02% -0,06% 0,59% 0,44%
Day -17 0,30% 0,13% -0,14% -0,21% -0,01% -0,53% 0,42% 0,85%
Day -16 -0,17% -0,04% -0,13% -0,34% 0,19% -0,34% 0,35% 1,20%
Day -15 0,04% 0,00% -0,01% -0,35% 0,01% -0,33% -1,50% -0,30%
Day -14 0,30% 0,30% -0,20% -0,55% -0,10% -0,55% -0,45% -0,75%
Day -13 -0,09% 0,22% 0,03% -0,52% -0,21% -0,63% -0,67% -1,42%
Day -12 -0,34% -0,13% -0,09% -0,61% -0,15% -0,61% -0,32% -1,74%
Day -11 -0,09% -0,22% -0,05% -0,66% -0,06% -0,84% 0,71% -1,03%
Day -10 -0,22% -0,44% -0,14% -0,80% 0,75% -0,80% 2,12% 1,09%
Day -9 -0,30% -0,74% -0,17% -0,97% -0,14% -0,24% -1,31% -0,22%
Day -8 0,00% -0,74% -0,04% -1,02% -0,14% -1,02% -0,86% -1,07%
Day -7 -0,17% -0,91% -0,26% -1,28% -0,11% -0,48% 0,27% -0,81%
Day -6 -0,40% -1,31% -0,07% -1,36% 0,24% -1,36% 0,81% 0,01%
Day -5 -0,12% -1,44% -0,32% -1,68% -0,35% -0,59% -0,38% -0,37%
Day -4 -0,09% -1,52% 0,05% -1,63% -0,32% -1,63% -0,95% -1,33%
Day -3 -0,37% -1,89% -0,30% -1,93% -0,19% -1,11% -0,47% -1,80%
Day -2 -0,09% -1,98% -0,54% -2,47% -0,35% -2,47% 0,68% -1,12%
Day -1 0,02% -1,96% 0,19% -2,27% 0,43% -1,03% -0,51% -1,63%
Day -0 0,01% -1,95% 0,27% -2,00% 0,91% -2,00% 0,65% -0,98%
Day 1 0,37% -1,58% 0,07% -1,93% 0,21% 0,08% 0,21% -0,77%
Day 2 -0,16% -1,75% -0,08% -2,01% 0,24% -2,01% 0,56% -0,21%
Day 3 0,05% -1,70% 0,27% -1,74% 0,58% 0,90% -1,47% -1,69%
Day 4 0,26% -1,43% 0,16% -1,59% 0,28% -1,59% 0,60% -1,09%
Day 5 -0,34% -1,77% 0,11% -1,48% 0,69% 1,87% 0,11% -0,98%
Day 6 -0,10% -1,87% 0,09% -1,39% 0,43% -1,39% -0,54% -1,52%
Day 7 0,34% -1,53% -0,03% -1,42% -0,23% 2,07% 1,08% -0,45%
Day 8 -0,01% -1,54% -0,16% -1,58% 0,40% -1,58% -0,67% -1,11%
Day 9 0,16% -1,38% 0,09% -1,48% -0,16% 2,30% 0,27% -0,84%
Day 10 0,18% -1,20% 0,01% -1,47% 0,26% -1,47% 1,09% 0,25%
Day 11 0,32% -0,88% -0,10% -1,57% -0,25% 2,31% -0,34% -0,10%
Day 12 0,20% -0,68% -0,10% -1,67% 0,11% -1,67% -1,13% -1,23%
Day 13 -0,31% -0,98% 0,33% -1,34% 0,20% 2,62% -0,32% -1,55%
Day 14 0,29% -0,69% 0,11% -1,23% 0,60% -1,23% -0,72% -2,27%
Day 15 -0,07% -0,76% 0,17% -1,06% 0,28% 3,50% 1,00% -1,27%
Day 16 -0,18% -0,95% -0,05% -1,11% 0,20% -1,11% -0,49% -1,76%
Day 17 0,09% -0,86% -0,01% -1,11% 0,27% 3,96% -0,12% -1,88%
Day 18 0,01% -0,85% -0,07% -1,18% 0,02% -1,18% 0,52% -1,36%
Day 19 -0,10% -0,95% 0,17% -1,01% 0,05% 4,03% 1,22% -0,13%
Day 20 0,00% -0,95% 0,13% -0,88% -0,28% -0,88% 0,27% 0,13%
Top 40 Mid Cap Small Cap Fledgling
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Appendix 3b –Purchase CAARs during Event Window by Company Size  
 
Purchases
AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%)
Day -20 -0,16% -0,16% -0,31% -0,31% -0,36% -0,36% 0,44% 0,44%
Day -19 0,20% 0,05% 0,01% -0,29% -0,17% -0,53% -1,10% -0,66%
Day -18 -0,03% 0,02% 0,26% -0,12% -0,02% -0,55% -0,46% -1,12%
Day -17 0,27% 0,29% -0,14% -0,21% 0,26% -0,29% 0,52% -0,60%
Day -16 0,01% 0,30% -0,12% -0,40% 0,18% -0,11% -0,35% -0,94%
Day -15 0,08% 0,38% -0,01% -0,35% 0,10% 0,00% -1,39% -2,33%
Day -14 0,03% 0,41% -0,08% -0,49% -0,29% -0,30% -0,79% -3,12%
Day -13 -0,06% 0,35% 0,03% -0,52% -0,48% -0,78% -0,19% -3,31%
Day -12 -0,22% 0,13% -0,09% -0,51% -0,13% -0,91% 0,02% -3,29%
Day -11 -0,13% 0,00% -0,05% -0,66% 0,13% -0,78% 0,09% -3,20%
Day -10 -0,16% -0,17% -0,19% -0,71% 0,67% -0,12% 1,17% -2,03%
Day -9 -0,18% -0,34% -0,17% -0,97% -0,23% -0,34% -0,38% -2,41%
Day -8 0,03% -0,31% 0,01% -0,81% -0,29% -0,63% -1,06% -3,47%
Day -7 0,04% -0,27% -0,26% -1,28% 0,07% -0,57% 0,65% -2,82%
Day -6 -0,15% -0,43% 0,03% -0,83% -0,41% -0,97% 0,77% -2,04%
Day -5 -0,23% -0,65% -0,32% -1,68% -0,40% -1,38% -0,67% -2,71%
Day -4 0,12% -0,54% 0,15% -1,00% -0,13% -1,51% -0,64% -3,35%
Day -3 -0,30% -0,84% -0,30% -1,93% 0,26% -1,25% -0,71% -4,06%
Day -2 -0,21% -1,06% -0,25% -1,42% -0,37% -1,62% 0,12% -3,94%
Day -1 0,00% -1,06% 0,19% -2,27% 0,56% -1,06% -0,08% -4,02%
Day -0 0,12% -0,94% 0,28% -1,03% 0,57% -0,49% 0,54% -3,48%
Day 1 0,28% -0,67% 0,07% -1,93% -0,01% -0,50% 0,10% -3,38%
Day 2 -0,08% -0,75% 0,02% -0,95% 0,13% -0,37% -0,03% -3,41%
Day 3 0,09% -0,66% 0,27% -1,74% 0,41% 0,04% -0,47% -3,88%
Day 4 0,16% -0,51% 0,00% -0,82% 0,33% 0,37% 0,35% -3,53%
Day 5 -0,21% -0,72% 0,11% -1,48% 0,48% 0,85% -0,04% -3,58%
Day 6 -0,17% -0,89% 0,06% -0,71% 0,30% 1,15% -0,07% -3,65%
Day 7 0,19% -0,70% -0,03% -1,42% -0,25% 0,90% 0,37% -3,28%
Day 8 -0,25% -0,95% -0,23% -0,89% 0,36% 1,26% -1,25% -4,54%
Day 9 0,22% -0,73% 0,09% -1,48% -0,05% 1,21% 0,69% -3,85%
Day 10 -0,08% -0,82% 0,02% -0,67% 0,03% 1,24% 0,15% -3,70%
Day 11 0,17% -0,64% -0,10% -1,57% -0,09% 1,15% 0,03% -3,67%
Day 12 0,13% -0,51% 0,01% -0,73% 0,34% 1,49% -0,60% -4,27%
Day 13 -0,22% -0,73% 0,33% -1,34% -0,02% 1,48% 0,01% -4,26%
Day 14 0,15% -0,58% 0,03% -0,59% 0,09% 1,57% -0,46% -4,72%
Day 15 -0,10% -0,68% 0,17% -1,06% 0,26% 1,84% 0,13% -4,58%
Day 16 -0,26% -0,94% -0,12% -0,73% 0,01% 1,84% -0,62% -5,21%
Day 17 0,11% -0,83% -0,01% -1,11% 0,20% 2,04% -0,99% -6,20%
Day 18 -0,07% -0,90% -0,02% -0,77% 0,12% 2,15% 0,00% -6,20%
Day 19 0,06% -0,85% 0,17% -1,01% 0,18% 2,34% -0,02% -6,21%
Day 20 -0,07% -0,92% 0,05% -0,71% -0,15% 2,19% 0,19% -6,02%
Small Cap FledglingTop 40 Mid Cap
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Appendix 3c –Sale CAARs during Event Window by Company Size  
 
Sales
AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%)
Day -20 -0,21% -0,21% -0,01% -0,01% -0,13% -0,13% -0,17% -0,17%
Day -19 0,19% -0,02% -0,08% -0,09% 0,15% 0,02% -0,33% -0,51%
Day -18 0,21% 0,18% 0,03% -0,06% -0,05% -0,03% -1,05% -1,55%
Day -17 -0,03% 0,16% -0,02% -0,08% 0,27% 0,25% 0,10% -1,45%
Day -16 0,18% 0,34% 0,02% -0,06% -0,01% 0,23% -0,69% -2,14%
Day -15 0,04% 0,37% 0,00% -0,06% 0,09% 0,32% 0,11% -2,03%
Day -14 -0,27% 0,10% 0,12% 0,06% -0,20% 0,13% -0,34% -2,37%
Day -13 0,03% 0,13% 0,05% 0,11% -0,27% -0,15% 0,48% -1,89%
Day -12 0,12% 0,25% 0,00% 0,10% 0,02% -0,12% 0,34% -1,55%
Day -11 -0,04% 0,21% 0,03% 0,13% 0,18% 0,06% -0,62% -2,17%
Day -10 0,06% 0,27% -0,05% 0,09% -0,08% -0,02% -0,95% -3,11%
Day -9 0,13% 0,40% 0,06% 0,15% -0,08% -0,11% 0,92% -2,19%
Day -8 0,03% 0,43% 0,05% 0,20% -0,15% -0,26% -0,20% -2,40%
Day -7 0,21% 0,64% 0,22% 0,43% 0,17% -0,09% 0,38% -2,01%
Day -6 0,25% 0,89% 0,10% 0,53% -0,65% -0,73% -0,04% -2,05%
Day -5 -0,11% 0,78% 0,00% 0,53% -0,05% -0,79% -0,29% -2,34%
Day -4 0,20% 0,98% 0,11% 0,63% 0,20% -0,59% 0,32% -2,02%
Day -3 0,07% 1,05% 0,12% 0,76% 0,45% -0,14% -0,24% -2,26%
Day -2 -0,13% 0,92% 0,29% 1,04% -0,01% -0,16% -0,56% -2,82%
Day -1 -0,02% 0,90% -0,08% 0,96% 0,13% -0,03% 0,43% -2,39%
Day -0 0,10% 1,01% 0,00% 0,96% -0,34% -0,36% -0,11% -2,51%
Day 1 -0,09% 0,92% -0,01% 0,96% -0,22% -0,58% -0,11% -2,61%
Day 2 0,08% 0,99% 0,11% 1,06% -0,11% -0,69% -0,58% -3,20%
Day 3 0,04% 1,03% -0,14% 0,92% -0,17% -0,86% 1,00% -2,20%
Day 4 -0,11% 0,93% -0,16% 0,77% 0,05% -0,82% -0,25% -2,44%
Day 5 0,12% 1,05% -0,06% 0,71% -0,20% -1,02% -0,15% -2,60%
Day 6 -0,07% 0,98% -0,03% 0,68% -0,14% -1,15% 0,47% -2,12%
Day 7 -0,15% 0,83% 0,08% 0,75% -0,01% -1,17% -0,71% -2,84%
Day 8 -0,24% 0,59% -0,07% 0,69% -0,04% -1,20% -0,59% -3,42%
Day 9 0,05% 0,64% 0,11% 0,80% 0,12% -1,09% 0,42% -3,00%
Day 10 -0,26% 0,38% 0,00% 0,80% -0,23% -1,32% -0,94% -3,94%
Day 11 -0,14% 0,24% 0,04% 0,84% 0,16% -1,16% 0,37% -3,57%
Day 12 -0,07% 0,17% 0,11% 0,94% 0,23% -0,93% 0,53% -3,04%
Day 13 0,08% 0,25% -0,22% 0,72% -0,22% -1,15% 0,33% -2,71%
Day 14 -0,14% 0,11% -0,08% 0,64% -0,50% -1,65% 0,26% -2,45%
Day 15 -0,03% 0,08% -0,19% 0,45% -0,01% -1,66% -0,86% -3,31%
Day 16 -0,08% 0,00% -0,08% 0,37% -0,19% -1,85% -0,14% -3,45%
Day 17 0,02% 0,02% -0,01% 0,37% -0,07% -1,92% -0,87% -4,32%
Day 18 -0,08% -0,05% 0,05% 0,41% 0,10% -1,82% -0,52% -4,84%
Day 19 0,16% 0,10% -0,17% 0,25% 0,13% -1,69% -1,24% -6,08%
Day 20 -0,07% 0,03% -0,08% 0,17% 0,13% -1,55% -0,08% -6,16%
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AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%)
Day -20 0,00% 0,00% -0,21% -0,21% -0,42% -0,42% -0,02% -0,02%
Day -19 -0,42% -0,42% -0,20% -0,41% 0,03% -0,39% -0,21% -0,24%
Day -18 -0,17% -0,59% -0,55% -0,96% 0,05% -0,34% 0,11% -0,13%
Day -17 0,63% 0,04% 0,11% -0,85% -0,02% -0,36% -0,11% -0,24%
Day -16 -0,09% -0,05% 1,30% 0,45% -0,22% -0,58% -0,06% -0,30%
Day -15 0,06% 0,01% 0,12% 0,57% -0,20% -0,78% 0,24% -0,06%
Day -14 -0,34% -0,32% 0,45% 1,02% 0,24% -0,54% -0,02% -0,08%
Day -13 -0,10% -0,42% -1,27% -0,25% 0,24% -0,30% -0,10% -0,18%
Day -12 0,08% -0,34% 0,08% -0,17% -0,36% -0,66% -0,01% -0,19%
Day -11 -0,25% -0,59% 0,49% 0,32% -0,27% -0,93% -0,08% -0,27%
Day -10 -0,29% -0,88% 1,52% 1,84% 0,01% -0,92% 0,05% -0,22%
Day -9 -0,68% -1,56% -1,35% 0,49% -0,24% -1,15% 0,07% -0,15%
Day -8 -0,11% -1,67% 0,53% 1,02% 0,24% -0,91% -0,40% -0,55%
Day -7 -0,27% -1,94% -0,50% 0,52% -0,37% -1,28% 0,14% -0,41%
Day -6 -0,63% -2,57% -0,58% -0,06% 0,12% -1,15% 0,22% -0,19%
Day -5 -1,17% -3,74% 0,08% 0,02% -0,10% -1,26% -0,22% -0,41%
Day -4 -0,39% -4,13% -0,29% -0,27% 0,00% -1,25% -0,31% -0,72%
Day -3 -0,62% -4,75% -0,15% -0,42% -0,25% -1,50% -0,62% -1,34%
Day -2 -0,45% -5,20% -0,07% -0,49% -0,84% -2,35% -0,28% -1,63%
Day -1 0,19% -5,01% 0,63% 0,14% 0,02% -2,32% 0,03% -1,60%
Day -0 0,96% -4,04% 0,67% 0,81% -0,03% -2,36% 0,36% -1,24%
Day 1 -0,04% -4,09% 0,35% 1,16% 0,27% -2,09% 0,11% -1,13%
Day 2 -0,46% -4,55% -0,17% 0,99% 0,37% -1,71% -0,43% -1,57%
Day 3 0,41% -4,13% 0,00% 1,00% 0,21% -1,51% 0,28% -1,29%
Day 4 0,21% -3,92% 0,20% 1,19% 0,17% -1,33% 0,31% -0,98%
Day 5 0,79% -3,13% -0,35% 0,84% 0,17% -1,17% 0,09% -0,89%
Day 6 0,16% -2,97% 0,08% 0,92% -0,16% -1,33% 0,21% -0,68%
Day 7 0,13% -2,83% -1,68% -0,76% 0,70% -0,63% -0,20% -0,88%
Day 8 0,09% -2,74% 0,25% -0,51% -0,27% -0,90% -0,29% -1,16%
Day 9 0,08% -2,66% -0,27% -0,78% 0,02% -0,89% 0,16% -1,00%
Day 10 0,05% -2,62% 0,13% -0,65% -0,02% -0,91% 0,02% -0,98%
Day 11 1,11% -1,50% -0,77% -1,42% -0,12% -1,03% -0,14% -1,12%
Day 12 -0,13% -1,63% -0,89% -2,30% -0,01% -1,04% 0,09% -1,03%
Day 13 0,99% -0,64% 0,56% -1,74% 0,09% -0,95% -0,18% -1,21%
Day 14 -0,07% -0,71% 0,49% -1,25% 0,15% -0,80% 0,26% -0,95%
Day 15 -0,11% -0,82% 0,75% -0,50% -0,26% -1,06% 0,15% -0,81%
Day 16 0,06% -0,75% 0,51% 0,01% 0,04% -1,01% -0,24% -1,05%
Day 17 -0,05% -0,80% 0,49% 0,50% 0,35% -0,66% -0,02% -1,07%
Day 18 -0,52% -1,32% -0,29% 0,22% 0,23% -0,43% 0,34% -0,73%
Day 19 0,15% -1,18% 0,38% 0,60% 0,25% -0,18% -0,21% -0,94%
Day 20 0,07% -1,11% -0,93% -0,34% 0,35% 0,16% 0,01% -0,93%
Financials
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Appendix 4a continued– Combined CAARs during Event Window by Company Industry  
 
Combined
AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%)
Day -20 -0,14% -0,14% 0,62% 0,62% -1,06% -1,06%
Day -19 -0,28% -0,42% -0,53% 0,10% -0,11% -1,16%
Day -18 0,13% -0,29% 0,09% 0,19% 0,04% -1,13%
Day -17 -0,20% -0,49% -0,95% -0,76% 0,63% -0,50%
Day -16 0,04% -0,44% -0,48% -1,24% -0,79% -1,29%
Day -15 -0,16% -0,60% -0,63% -1,87% -0,67% -1,95%
Day -14 0,08% -0,52% -0,19% -2,06% -0,33% -2,28%
Day -13 0,26% -0,27% 0,25% -1,81% -1,06% -3,34%
Day -12 -0,36% -0,63% -0,77% -2,58% -0,28% -3,62%
Day -11 0,05% -0,58% 0,26% -2,32% 0,75% -2,87%
Day -10 0,06% -0,51% -0,12% -2,43% 0,33% -2,54%
Day -9 -0,19% -0,71% 0,02% -2,41% -0,34% -2,88%
Day -8 -0,32% -1,03% -0,52% -2,94% -0,27% -3,15%
Day -7 0,00% -1,03% -0,80% -3,74% -0,75% -3,89%
Day -6 -0,25% -1,28% 0,38% -3,36% -0,03% -3,92%
Day -5 -0,14% -1,42% -0,36% -3,72% -0,68% -4,60%
Day -4 0,00% -1,41% 0,22% -3,49% -0,59% -5,19%
Day -3 0,11% -1,30% 0,20% -3,29% 0,04% -5,15%
Day -2 0,02% -1,28% -0,59% -3,88% 0,01% -5,14%
Day -1 0,03% -1,25% 0,20% -3,69% 0,69% -4,45%
Day -0 0,85% -0,40% 0,53% -3,16% -0,33% -4,78%
Day 1 -0,02% -0,42% 0,34% -2,81% 0,26% -4,53%
Day 2 0,39% -0,03% -0,18% -3,00% 0,65% -3,88%
Day 3 0,18% 0,15% 0,36% -2,64% -0,72% -4,60%
Day 4 0,59% 0,75% -0,11% -2,75% 0,98% -3,62%
Day 5 -0,22% 0,53% 0,13% -2,62% 0,04% -3,58%
Day 6 0,33% 0,86% 0,06% -2,57% 0,13% -3,45%
Day 7 -0,11% 0,75% -0,04% -2,60% 0,32% -3,13%
Day 8 0,52% 1,26% 0,25% -2,35% -0,42% -3,56%
Day 9 0,10% 1,36% -0,57% -2,93% -0,17% -3,73%
Day 10 0,05% 1,41% 0,50% -2,42% 0,47% -3,26%
Day 11 -0,06% 1,35% 0,02% -2,40% -0,88% -4,14%
Day 12 0,01% 1,37% 0,20% -2,21% 0,19% -3,95%
Day 13 -0,29% 1,08% -0,24% -2,45% 0,43% -3,52%
Day 14 0,34% 1,42% 0,16% -2,28% 0,06% -3,46%
Day 15 0,23% 1,65% -0,08% -2,37% 0,00% -3,46%
Day 16 -0,20% 1,45% -0,35% -2,71% 0,09% -3,37%
Day 17 -0,24% 1,21% 0,41% -2,30% -0,59% -3,96%
Day 18 -0,18% 1,03% -0,41% -2,72% 0,10% -3,85%
Day 19 0,43% 1,46% -0,44% -3,16% 0,23% -3,63%
Day 20 -0,03% 1,42% 0,39% -2,77% -0,67% -4,30%
Industrials Health Care








AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%)
Day -20 -0,53% -0,53% -0,55% -0,55% -0,28% -0,28% -0,01% -0,01%
Day -19 -0,03% -0,56% 0,26% -0,29% 0,02% -0,26% -0,16% -0,17%
Day -18 -0,08% -0,64% -0,04% -0,33% 0,03% -0,23% 0,13% -0,04%
Day -17 0,71% 0,07% 0,28% -0,05% -0,15% -0,38% 0,05% 0,01%
Day -16 -0,04% 0,03% 0,47% 0,42% -0,03% -0,41% -0,02% -0,01%
Day -15 -0,10% -0,07% -0,18% 0,25% -0,18% -0,59% 0,22% 0,21%
Day -14 -0,48% -0,55% 0,20% 0,44% -0,05% -0,63% -0,07% 0,15%
Day -13 -0,37% -0,92% -0,56% -0,12% 0,19% -0,45% 0,04% 0,19%
Day -12 0,20% -0,72% -0,14% -0,26% -0,16% -0,61% 0,04% 0,23%
Day -11 -0,20% -0,91% 0,52% 0,26% -0,24% -0,85% -0,16% 0,06%
Day -10 -0,29% -1,20% 1,30% 1,56% -0,01% -0,86% 0,01% 0,08%
Day -9 -0,20% -1,40% -1,06% 0,50% -0,11% -0,98% -0,01% 0,06%
Day -8 -0,11% -1,52% 0,17% 0,67% 0,11% -0,86% -0,24% -0,18%
Day -7 0,31% -1,21% -0,52% 0,16% -0,14% -1,00% 0,07% -0,11%
Day -6 0,20% -1,00% -0,31% -0,16% -0,01% -1,01% 0,03% -0,08%
Day -5 -1,20% -2,21% 0,14% -0,02% -0,15% -1,16% -0,15% -0,24%
Day -4 -0,25% -2,46% -0,02% -0,05% 0,18% -0,98% -0,09% -0,32%
Day -3 -0,39% -2,85% 0,09% 0,05% 0,02% -0,96% -0,46% -0,78%
Day -2 -0,53% -3,38% 0,01% 0,06% -0,56% -1,52% -0,27% -1,05%
Day -1 -0,05% -3,44% 0,42% 0,48% 0,03% -1,49% 0,04% -1,01%
Day -0 0,97% -2,47% 0,57% 1,06% 0,13% -1,35% 0,34% -0,67%
Day 1 0,11% -2,36% 0,04% 1,10% 0,18% -1,17% -0,02% -0,69%
Day 2 -0,11% -2,47% -0,04% 1,06% 0,20% -0,97% -0,28% -0,98%
Day 3 0,66% -1,81% -0,53% 0,53% 0,08% -0,89% 0,19% -0,79%
Day 4 0,43% -1,38% 0,08% 0,61% 0,10% -0,79% 0,14% -0,65%
Day 5 0,73% -0,65% 0,05% 0,66% 0,06% -0,73% 0,01% -0,64%
Day 6 -0,04% -0,69% -0,30% 0,36% -0,08% -0,81% 0,14% -0,50%
Day 7 0,10% -0,59% -1,32% -0,96% 0,56% -0,25% -0,06% -0,56%
Day 8 -0,35% -0,95% 0,14% -0,82% -0,31% -0,56% -0,14% -0,70%
Day 9 0,31% -0,64% 0,08% -0,74% 0,07% -0,48% 0,12% -0,57%
Day 10 -0,11% -0,75% 0,03% -0,72% -0,13% -0,61% 0,03% -0,54%
Day 11 0,83% 0,08% -0,47% -1,18% -0,08% -0,70% 0,00% -0,55%
Day 12 -0,27% -0,18% -0,14% -1,32% 0,16% -0,53% 0,12% -0,43%
Day 13 0,71% 0,53% -0,02% -1,34% -0,08% -0,61% -0,07% -0,50%
Day 14 -0,33% 0,20% -0,02% -1,36% 0,12% -0,49% -0,02% -0,52%
Day 15 -0,23% -0,03% 1,10% -0,25% -0,38% -0,87% -0,11% -0,63%
Day 16 -0,20% -0,23% -0,55% -0,81% 0,08% -0,78% -0,11% -0,74%
Day 17 0,23% 0,00% 0,61% -0,19% 0,11% -0,67% -0,04% -0,78%
Day 18 -0,41% -0,40% -0,24% -0,43% -0,02% -0,69% 0,11% -0,67%
Day 19 0,28% -0,13% 0,41% -0,02% 0,28% -0,41% -0,18% -0,86%
Day 20 -0,06% -0,18% -0,70% -0,72% 0,21% -0,20% 0,07% -0,79%
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Appendix 4b continued– Purchase CAARs during Event Window by Company Industry  
 
Purchase
AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%)
Day -20 -0,41% -0,41% 0,37% 0,37% -0,58% -0,58%
Day -19 -0,46% -0,87% -0,37% 0,00% 0,15% -0,42%
Day -18 0,04% -0,82% 0,12% 0,12% -0,03% -0,45%
Day -17 -0,29% -1,11% -0,61% -0,49% 0,46% 0,00%
Day -16 -0,12% -1,23% -0,24% -0,73% -0,29% -0,29%
Day -15 -0,03% -1,26% -0,15% -0,88% -0,57% -0,86%
Day -14 0,08% -1,17% 0,08% -0,80% -0,14% -1,00%
Day -13 -0,14% -1,32% 0,16% -0,64% -0,16% -1,16%
Day -12 -0,31% -1,63% -0,72% -1,37% -0,18% -1,34%
Day -11 0,06% -1,57% 0,21% -1,15% 0,71% -0,62%
Day -10 -0,02% -1,59% 0,03% -1,13% -0,03% -0,65%
Day -9 -0,31% -1,90% -0,11% -1,24% 0,05% -0,60%
Day -8 -0,18% -2,07% -0,70% -1,94% -0,26% -0,86%
Day -7 0,17% -1,90% -0,64% -2,58% -0,32% -1,18%
Day -6 -0,44% -2,35% 0,03% -2,55% 0,09% -1,09%
Day -5 -0,27% -2,62% -0,50% -3,05% -0,74% -1,83%
Day -4 0,02% -2,60% 0,30% -2,75% -0,18% -2,01%
Day -3 0,15% -2,44% 0,16% -2,59% -0,03% -2,04%
Day -2 -0,05% -2,49% -0,43% -3,02% -0,07% -2,11%
Day -1 0,35% -2,14% -0,18% -3,20% 0,63% -1,48%
Day -0 0,52% -1,63% 0,30% -2,90% -0,28% -1,76%
Day 1 -0,13% -1,75% 0,25% -2,65% 0,48% -1,28%
Day 2 0,39% -1,36% -0,01% -2,67% 0,24% -1,05%
Day 3 0,13% -1,23% 0,22% -2,44% -0,63% -1,68%
Day 4 0,28% -0,95% -0,13% -2,58% 0,49% -1,19%
Day 5 -0,15% -1,10% 0,03% -2,55% -0,37% -1,56%
Day 6 0,34% -0,76% 0,06% -2,48% -0,10% -1,66%
Day 7 -0,10% -0,86% -0,19% -2,67% 0,13% -1,53%
Day 8 0,09% -0,77% 0,50% -2,17% -0,86% -2,39%
Day 9 0,12% -0,65% -0,33% -2,50% 0,33% -2,06%
Day 10 -0,31% -0,96% 0,16% -2,35% 0,51% -1,55%
Day 11 -0,08% -1,05% -0,20% -2,54% -0,27% -1,82%
Day 12 0,09% -0,95% 0,06% -2,49% 0,39% -1,44%
Day 13 -0,37% -1,32% -0,32% -2,81% 0,24% -1,19%
Day 14 0,11% -1,22% 0,26% -2,55% -0,27% -1,47%
Day 15 0,12% -1,09% -0,39% -2,94% 0,37% -1,10%
Day 16 -0,32% -1,41% -0,28% -3,22% -0,31% -1,41%
Day 17 -0,14% -1,55% 0,20% -3,03% -0,59% -2,00%
Day 18 0,00% -1,54% 0,29% -2,74% 0,36% -1,64%
Day 19 0,06% -1,49% -0,37% -3,11% -0,03% -1,67%
Day 20 -0,01% -1,49% 0,09% -3,02% -0,80% -2,47%
Health Care









AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%)
Day -20 -0,53% -0,53% -0,34% -0,34% -0,42% -0,42% 0,02% 0,02%
Day -19 0,39% -0,14% 0,47% 0,12% 0,03% -0,39% 0,05% 0,07%
Day -18 0,09% -0,05% 0,51% 0,63% 0,05% -0,34% 0,02% 0,09%
Day -17 0,09% 0,03% 0,17% 0,80% -0,02% -0,36% 0,16% 0,25%
Day -16 0,05% 0,08% -0,82% -0,02% -0,22% -0,58% 0,04% 0,29%
Day -15 -0,16% -0,08% -0,30% -0,32% -0,20% -0,78% -0,02% 0,28%
Day -14 -0,15% -0,23% -0,26% -0,58% 0,24% -0,54% -0,05% 0,23%
Day -13 -0,27% -0,50% 0,71% 0,13% 0,24% -0,30% 0,14% 0,37%
Day -12 0,13% -0,37% -0,22% -0,09% -0,36% -0,66% 0,05% 0,42%
Day -11 0,05% -0,32% 0,03% -0,06% -0,27% -0,93% -0,08% 0,33%
Day -10 0,00% -0,33% -0,22% -0,28% 0,01% -0,92% -0,04% 0,30%
Day -9 0,48% 0,15% 0,29% 0,01% -0,24% -1,15% -0,08% 0,22%
Day -8 0,00% 0,15% -0,36% -0,35% 0,24% -0,91% 0,16% 0,37%
Day -7 0,58% 0,74% -0,01% -0,36% -0,37% -1,28% -0,08% 0,30%
Day -6 0,83% 1,57% 0,26% -0,10% 0,12% -1,15% -0,19% 0,11%
Day -5 -0,03% 1,53% 0,05% -0,04% -0,10% -1,26% 0,07% 0,17%
Day -4 0,14% 1,67% 0,27% 0,23% 0,00% -1,25% 0,23% 0,40%
Day -3 0,23% 1,90% 0,25% 0,47% -0,25% -1,50% 0,16% 0,56%
Day -2 -0,09% 1,81% 0,08% 0,55% -0,84% -2,35% 0,01% 0,57%
Day -1 -0,25% 1,57% -0,21% 0,34% 0,02% -2,32% 0,01% 0,59%
Day -0 0,01% 1,57% -0,10% 0,25% -0,03% -2,36% -0,02% 0,57%
Day 1 0,15% 1,73% -0,31% -0,07% 0,27% -2,09% -0,12% 0,44%
Day 2 0,35% 2,08% 0,13% 0,07% 0,37% -1,71% 0,15% 0,59%
Day 3 0,24% 2,32% -0,53% -0,46% 0,21% -1,51% -0,09% 0,50%
Day 4 0,22% 2,54% -0,12% -0,58% 0,17% -1,33% -0,18% 0,32%
Day 5 -0,06% 2,48% 0,40% -0,18% 0,17% -1,17% -0,08% 0,24%
Day 6 -0,20% 2,28% -0,38% -0,56% -0,16% -1,33% -0,07% 0,17%
Day 7 -0,04% 2,24% 0,36% -0,20% 0,70% -0,63% 0,14% 0,32%
Day 8 -0,44% 1,80% -0,12% -0,32% -0,27% -0,90% 0,15% 0,46%
Day 9 0,23% 2,02% 0,35% 0,03% 0,02% -0,89% -0,04% 0,43%
Day 10 -0,15% 1,87% -0,10% -0,07% -0,02% -0,91% 0,01% 0,43%
Day 11 -0,28% 1,59% 0,30% 0,23% -0,12% -1,03% 0,13% 0,57%
Day 12 -0,14% 1,45% 0,75% 0,98% -0,01% -1,04% 0,03% 0,60%
Day 13 -0,28% 1,17% -0,58% 0,41% 0,09% -0,95% 0,11% 0,71%
Day 14 -0,26% 0,91% -0,51% -0,11% 0,15% -0,80% -0,28% 0,43%
Day 15 -0,12% 0,79% 0,35% 0,25% -0,26% -1,06% -0,25% 0,18%
Day 16 -0,26% 0,52% -1,07% -0,82% 0,04% -1,01% 0,13% 0,31%
Day 17 0,28% 0,80% 0,12% -0,70% 0,35% -0,66% -0,02% 0,29%
Day 18 0,12% 0,92% 0,05% -0,65% 0,23% -0,43% -0,23% 0,06%
Day 19 0,13% 1,05% 0,03% -0,62% 0,25% -0,18% 0,03% 0,09%
Day 20 -0,13% 0,92% 0,23% -0,39% 0,35% 0,16% 0,06% 0,15%
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Appendix 4c continued– Sale CAARs during Event Window by Company Industry  
Sale
AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%) AARs (%) CAAR(%)
Day -20 -0,26% -0,26% -0,26% -0,26% 0,48% 0,48%
Day -19 -0,18% -0,44% 0,15% -0,10% 0,26% 0,74%
Day -18 -0,09% -0,53% 0,03% -0,07% -0,07% 0,68%
Day -17 -0,09% -0,62% 0,34% 0,27% -0,17% 0,50%
Day -16 -0,16% -0,78% 0,24% 0,51% 0,50% 1,00%
Day -15 0,13% -0,65% 0,48% 0,99% 0,10% 1,10%
Day -14 0,00% -0,65% 0,27% 1,26% 0,19% 1,28%
Day -13 -0,40% -1,05% -0,09% 1,17% 0,90% 2,18%
Day -12 0,05% -1,00% 0,05% 1,21% 0,10% 2,28%
Day -11 0,00% -1,00% -0,05% 1,16% -0,03% 2,25%
Day -10 -0,08% -1,08% 0,14% 1,30% -0,36% 1,89%
Day -9 -0,12% -1,19% -0,13% 1,18% 0,39% 2,28%
Day -8 0,15% -1,05% -0,18% 1,00% 0,01% 2,29%
Day -7 0,17% -0,87% 0,15% 1,15% 0,43% 2,72%
Day -6 -0,19% -1,07% -0,34% 0,81% 0,12% 2,83%
Day -5 -0,14% -1,20% -0,15% 0,67% -0,06% 2,77%
Day -4 0,02% -1,19% 0,07% 0,74% 0,40% 3,18%
Day -3 0,04% -1,15% -0,04% 0,70% -0,07% 3,11%
Day -2 -0,07% -1,21% 0,16% 0,86% -0,08% 3,03%
Day -1 0,32% -0,89% -0,37% 0,49% -0,06% 2,98%
Day -0 -0,33% -1,22% -0,23% 0,26% 0,05% 3,02%
Day 1 -0,11% -1,33% -0,10% 0,16% 0,22% 3,24%
Day 2 0,00% -1,33% 0,17% 0,33% -0,41% 2,83%
Day 3 -0,05% -1,38% -0,14% 0,20% 0,09% 2,92%
Day 4 -0,32% -1,70% -0,02% 0,17% -0,49% 2,42%
Day 5 0,07% -1,63% -0,09% 0,08% -0,40% 2,02%
Day 6 0,01% -1,62% 0,01% 0,08% -0,23% 1,79%
Day 7 0,01% -1,61% -0,15% -0,07% -0,19% 1,60%
Day 8 -0,43% -2,04% 0,25% 0,18% -0,44% 1,16%
Day 9 0,02% -2,02% 0,24% 0,42% 0,51% 1,67%
Day 10 -0,36% -2,37% -0,35% 0,07% 0,04% 1,71%
Day 11 -0,03% -2,40% -0,22% -0,14% 0,60% 2,31%
Day 12 0,08% -2,32% -0,14% -0,28% 0,20% 2,51%
Day 13 -0,08% -2,40% -0,08% -0,37% -0,18% 2,33%
Day 14 -0,23% -2,64% 0,10% -0,27% -0,34% 1,99%
Day 15 -0,11% -2,74% -0,31% -0,57% 0,37% 2,37%
Day 16 -0,12% -2,86% 0,06% -0,51% -0,41% 1,96%
Day 17 0,11% -2,75% -0,22% -0,73% 0,00% 1,96%
Day 18 0,18% -2,57% 0,70% -0,02% 0,25% 2,21%
Day 19 -0,37% -2,94% 0,07% 0,05% -0,26% 1,95%
Day 20 0,03% -2,92% -0,30% -0,25% -0,13% 1,82%
Industrials Health Care




Appendix 5- Index Specific Market Proxy 
a) Top 40 (J200) 
Figure 21- Sales & Purchases CAAR's for Top 40 firms – J200 Market Proxy 
 
 
b) Mid Cap (J201) 











































c) Small Cap (J202) 
Figure 23- Sales & Purchases CAAR's for Small Cap firms – J202 Market Proxy 
 
 
d) Fledgling (J204) 
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